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FOREWORD
The Second Combined Manufacturers' and Technologists' Conference was hosted
jointly by NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in Williamsburg, Virginia on October 18-20, 1988. The meeting was
co-chaired by Dr. Roland Bowles of LaRC and Herbert Schlickenmaier of the FAA.
Amos Spady of LaRC and the Science and Technology Corporation coordinated the
meeting.
The purpose of the meeting was to transfer significant ongoing results gained during
the second year of the NASA/FAA joint Airborne Wind Shear Program to the technical
industry and to pose problems of current concern to the combined group. It also
provided a forum for manufacturers to review forward-look technology concepts and for
technologists to gain an understanding of the problems encountered by the manufacturers
during the development of airborne equipment and the FAA certification requirements.
The present document has been compiled to record the essence of the technology
updates and discussions which followed each. Updates are represented here through the
unedited duplication of the vugraphs, which were generously provided by the respective
speakers. When time was available questions were requested in writing. Questions and
answers from the floor are included for all sessions. The written questions were presented
and answered in the final session and are included in the document. Several of the
speakers did not have vugraphs; their talks were transcribed from the recordings of the
sessions, edited by the speaker, and are included. Additionally, the opening overview by
Mr. David Johnson was transcribed and included to provide the reader with an
understanding of the multiple elements included in the Joint Airborne Wind Shear
Program.
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FLIGHT GUIDANCE RESEARCH FOR RECOVERY FROM
MICROBURST WIND SHEAR
David A. Hinton
NASA, Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia 23665
ABSTRACT
Research is in progress to develop flight strategy
concepts for avoidance and recovery from microburst wind
shears. The objectives of this study are to evaluate the
performance of various strategies for recovery from wind shear
encountered during the approach-to-landing, examine the
associated piloting factors, and evaluate the payoff of
forward-look sensing. Both batch and piloted simulations are
utilized. The industry-recommended manual recovery technique
is used as a baseline_i strategy. Two advanced strategies were
selected for the piloted tests. The first strategy emulates
the recovery characteristics shown by prior optimal trajectory
analysis, by initially tracking the glideslope, then
commanding a shallow climb. The second strategy generates a
flight path angle schedule that is a function of airplane
energy state and the instantaneous shear strength. All three
strategies are tested with reactive sensing only and with
forward-look sensing.
Piloted simulation tests are in progress. Tentative
results indicate that, using only reactive alerts, there
appears to be little difference in performance between the
various strategies. With forward-look alerts, the advanced
guidance strategies appear to have advantages over the
baseline strategy. Relatively short forward-look alert times,
on the order of 10 or 15 seconds, produce a far greater
recovery benefit than optimizing a recovery from a reactive
alert.
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Session II. Airborne-Flight Management
Analysis and Synthesis of a Wind Shear Detection Algorithm
Kioumars Najmabadi, Boeing
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WIND SHEAR HAZARD INDEX
( ENERGY DERIVATION)
1 2
E = Mgh I + ._- MV a
ES __W.E =hi+2_gl V_a
dEs 1 Va_r a
_" - i_s =hi + _"
DRAG EQUATION:
T cos(c_ +5) DVa= M +Wh sin _a)
THEREFORE :
_V x COS _/a + Wh sin Y a_
j Va + W h
AIRPLANE ENERGY RATE OF
CHANGE DUE TO WIND
Wx Wh'Y
Va _ Wh )) Va
--/_'x+WhTa/Va_. - W h
NORMALIZE WITH RESPECT TO VELOCITY:
F
Wx Wh
g V a
, _'O&L-JAlea _
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G(s) - 1 H(s)
(xs + 1) W
X
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X
GAIN(DB'S)
5.
0.
-5.
-10.
-15.
-20.
-25.
-30.
-35.
-40.
-45.
-50.
-55,
-60.
-65.
-70.
-75.
-80.
-85.
"rf = 2.5 sec fast "rs = 25 sec slow
................................ '""!" ...........i!,,
...........i ..........i ii .............i--ii ii i_o___....:.i.il)_!!!!!_--i-....i.-!..._..i..iiii!... il;!!!ii!,i}!:i!_,_-i_r__ii
_---'--i-4.-_.4..1., ........ 4
, , _ _,_, i i i ii!i ! i i l iiii i i !i iiil i i !! iii_]..[Ziil]]ii]!ii]i..-..-i]][filli",_-!........iKiiii"[_.-.i![]:.!]]ii7 !11-!iiiiiilil.
..............i L!i..........!i i:i111 !i.!i.. ........ ...i!!!............!i._2i.......i i i........i!iiii................i LL !Ii. . .i ii iili..................................................! i ill i!
0.0010 0.01 0.1 1 10 100
FREQ (RAD/SEC)
ATTENUATION OF HIGH FREQUENCY
BY FAST AND SLOW FILTERS
BOEINO
432
rn
Xl
433
U)
LU
.<
,.I
m
<c
I-
0
I--
C:
<[
ILl
-r"
:1• 01
• ..Ii .;io
÷ W
.J
<
I--
434
FIRST ORDER FILTER
TIME RESPONSE
s
H(S) - (_S -t- 1)
W X
t
W x
INPUT
K
t
Wx
FILTER'S
OUTPUT
K
mDw_n
!
I
t
1 t
L
Threshold
FILTER'S OUTPUT :
t
_/x =K-K e D_
THRESHOLD CROSSING TIME:
BO_'#NG
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SECOND ORDER FILTER
TIME RESPONSE
H(s) =
2 S
ton
2
S2 + 2_0)nS + (O n
CASE I : 0<_<1
e- _o_ nt sin 0)11 5 - _ 2t =L
CASE II : _ = 1
W x = 0)2t e-C°nt =L
CASE III: _ > 1
• _ -(_-_-_)oo_ _o -(_÷_-_)oo_
e 8
2 -1 2 -1
=L
NO_'JAFO
436
EXCEEDANCE STATISTICS
x(t) _l H(s) ] y(t)
7 I
l..
y(t)
t
N(y L) = _0_"= y P(y, _) d_
y=L
N (L) = The frequency of crossing the value of L
with positive slope per unit time
P (y, _) = Joint probability density of y (t) and _ (t)
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EXCEEDANCE STATISTICS
ASSUMING THAT y AND _r ARE STATISTICALLY INDEPENDENT :
P (y, Y) =P (Y)P(Y)
N (y)=p(y) _,p(3_) d_,
IF y IS GAUSSIAN :
P(y) =
1
P(y)= 1 1/2
(.2_ Oy)
1 2
- _(y/ay)
e
THEN
N(y) = 2/CC_y e -_'(y/°y)2
AF,LFLe'JN_"
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FREQUENCY DOMAIN APPROACH
c_2 = E (y2) -[E (y)]
Y
LET
E(y)=0, E(y) =o
THEN
2 m
Cyy=E(y2)=y 2, 2 _g2 --c_),= E ( ) "_
_ -- f+__yy
_y= y_ = I__1__ d002/I: _
f2 1 + 002 (I)yy do3(_br = _- - 2_
O0
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FREQUENCY DOMAIN APPROACH
White _1 shaping filterNoise (R) HT(S) Turbulence_d systemHs(s)
Y
v
(I)yy (03) = R HT (jc0) HT(-j CO)H s (jco) H S(-jco)
FOR THE PRESENT CASE:
HT(S)= _ (y-:s+1) DRYDEN TURBULENCE
s
Hs(S) = ('Cs + 1) 2
FILTER TRANSFER FUNCTION
WHERE
AND
Ls - SCALE LENGTH
Va = AIRSPEED
44O
white I
noise v[
FIRST ORDER FILTER
(HORIZONTAL WIND COMPONENT)
Turbulence_ [
Va
Y=Ls
2G2uy s 2
a'_x (s) - (v2- s2) (_2 s2 - 1)
("US +1)
S
_s+l
l?_rX
v
Wx
¢Wx (s)=
2G2Ts 4
(,y2_ s 2) (2:2s2_1) ([_2s2 _ 1)
02. 1 f+Wx = _ (1) _¢x (¢o) do) -
o.2. 1 f+"_ OW xW x = _--_- " ((a) do_ =
_O0
2
Gu Y
_(l+w)
2
o u y[l+y(z+]3)]
_x(VX + 1)(_ +[3)(1 + 7[3)
o/_ - y
N (L) - " e
X
EXPECTED NUMBER OF
THRESHOLD CROSSING
PER UNIT TIME
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SECOND ORDER FILTER
(HORIZONTAL WIND COMPONENT)
white_ lnoise
Ou_/_
s+T CtS
(s+ a)(s+ b)
202 T oc2s2
( s2-v_) (s2-a 2)(s2 -b2 )
J
s
W X
Wx
¢_wx (s)=
2 4
2Ou ycc2 S
(v_-s_)(_- a_)( s_-b_)
1 f+ o_ 2 0C2
°2wx : _ j _,Wx(o3 ) do) = °u Y
-,_ (7 + a) (7 + b) (a + b)
o2. 1 +oo [ T(a+b)+ abW x = _" f _ Wx (o3) do3 = 0 2 oc 2 Tu (T+ a) (7+b) (a +b)
--00
N(L) : X --"
e
2_OQx
EXPECTED NUMBER OF
THRESHOLD CROSSING
PER UNIT TIME
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white
noise
v
2(s + 3,)
FIRST ORDER FILTER
(VERTICAL WIND COMPONENT)
Turbulence I a
"-[ (s+a)
"Ca
• (s) =
Wh
_Wh (s) =
(T2-S2) 2 (a2-s 2)
(rz_ _z)2 (a2__ 2)
Wh
S
r
Wh
2 1 f+ooC_Wh = _ cb Wh(m ) d_ =
O0
o_ aCy + 2a)
2 (T + a) 2
2 1 +_
(_. --_ fW h 2x V_ h (03) do) =
c_ a 2 7(2"/' + 3a)
2
2(y+ a)
N(L) =
• -_--
(_Wh ' e
2x C_Wh
EXPECTED NUMBER OF
THRESHOLD CROSSING
PER UNIT TIME
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TIME DOMAIN APPROACH
white noise
(R) ÷
(t)= A(t) x(t) + B(t) w(t)
y= Cx
×(to) =Xo
WHERE
E[ w(t) w(x)] = R 8(t - x)
E[Xo] :mo
EI(x o- mo) (x o- mo)T]= Qo
THE STATE COVARIANCE MATRIX Q :
(t) = AQ + QA T + BRB T
Q(to) =Qo
STEADY-STATE VALUE OF Q :
AQ + QAT+ BRB T = 0 (LYAPUNOV EQUATION)
THE OUTPUT COVARIANCE MATRIX P :
P =CQC T
_'UEfAV_
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SECOND ORDER FILTER.
(HORIZONTAL WIND COMPONENT)
white noise _ s + y
(R)
Turbulence._ ! abs
. "_(a + s)(b+ s)
w;,
_(t) = A(t) x(t) + B(t) w(t)
y= Cx
DEFINE :
X -- Wx
x
y ... IIE Jw l_vx olo Wxw_= oo 1
STATE MODEL :
[ixll° ' ° lIw lElWx o o 1 Vex +
X '_ W
-AB -A2 -A1 x _u _/_
WHERE :
Al=a+b+7
A 2 = ab+ yb+ ya
A s = aby
,8'a_'E'J,,4t,_
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SECOND ORDER FILTER
( VERTICAL WIND COMPONENT )
w (t) _l
white(R)noise_
s
(S + 7) 2
(as + 1) (bs+ 1)
W h
r
Wh N Wh
w w
1
N (s + V)2 (as +1) (bs+ 1)
_,,, (s',r_ s+ 7¢-7-)
i(t) = A(t) x(t) + B(t) w(t)
y= Cx
DEFINE : FN
°°
N
X =
°o°
N
°°°°
N
Y=I
W h
STATE MODEL :
0 1 0 0 )
• 0 0 1 0
x = 0 0 0 1 x
A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4
WHERE :
AI= 72
y
I Wh 1W
h
2 2
27+ 7 a+ 7 b
A2 = ab
A 3 =
2
1+27a +27b+ 7
ab
(a + b+27ab )
A4 = - ab
ab
7_d7
0 7-,/7
W
w
°°Ix
8OEJA,'_
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EXCEEDANCE STATISTICS
(F-FACTOR)
F __
Wx Wh
g Va
1
E(F) = _ E(Wx) - "V'a E(Wh)
2 1 (32 1 2
(3F =_--_ Wx + _ (3V a Wh
o2: i o2 + I__ o2
2 WhF g2 Wx Va
o.N(L)- F e-'2"
2_ (3F
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H(S)-
S
(_S+l) 2
L = THRESHOLD = .15g
2O
Positive slop.e threshold crossings p.er hour as
a function of Dryden Gust intensity for various
filter time constants tau.
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S
H(S) = ('rs+l) 2
L =.15g
20
t-
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Ou INCREASING
2"5Filter coefficient Tau 3"5
I
4.5
O'U FPS
4.0 +
6.0 o
8.0 x
10.0o
12.0_
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S
H(S) =
(3S +1) 2
20
Positive slop.e threshold crossings p.er hour as
a function of Dryden Gust intensity for various
thresholds, L.
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S
H(S)- ( 3S +1)2
2O
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0.04 0.06
Positive slope threshold crossings per hour as
a Tunction of thresnold L, for various
Dryden gust intensities, sigma_u.
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H(S) -
s
(TS +1) 2
L = THRESHOLD = .15g
20
Detection time as a function of constant shear
intensity for various filter time constants.
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H(S)= S
(TS+I) 2
L =15g
20
Detection time vs filter time constant tau
for various constant shear levels
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i 1
_i_ter time constant (sect'.5
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s
H(S)- (3S +1)2
20
Detection time as a function of constant shear
intensity for various thresholds L.
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H(S) = S
(3S +1) 2
20
Detection time vs. threshold level
for various constant shear levels.
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s
H (S) -
2(_S + 1)
ou =8 FTISEC
20
Detection time as a function of shear intensity for second
order filter having varying nuisance alert rates
due to Dryden gust. E = .15 lu = 500, v = 228
o
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H(S) =
2
_n S
S2+2(wnS+wn 2
= .707
ou = 8 FT / SEC
20
Detection time as a function of shear intensity for second
order filter having varying nuisance alert rates
clue to Dryden gust. E = .15 lu = 500, v = 228
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4.00O 2.29
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H(S)=
S
(TS +I)
O'u = 8 FT/SEC
N(L) = 2 / HR J
20
Detection Time vs. Constant Shear for various
coefficient / threshold combinations that satisfy a
gust rejection requirement, N(L) = 2.0 / hr.
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H 1 =
(Ts + 1)
H2 S
(TS+I) 2
H ab = H(s) = S(as + 1) (bs + 1)
Hx=
L = THRESHOLD = .15g
O'u = 8 FT/SEC
N(L) = 2 / HR
18
16
14
4
2
2nd ORDER
COMPLEX
= .707
0
i
1.5 2.5
1stORDER T =5.6
2ndORDER / a=1.4 b=2.8
/ 1"=2.0
! i
3S._ear (Knofj4:5 515
TIME1 +
TIME2 o
TCMPL_
,TIMEABo
6.5
Detection time vs. Constant Shear for first and second order filters.
N(L) = 2.0 crossings per hour.
L = 0.15g
,B,O, EJJlV',I$ _
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,°
FILTER DESIGN METHOD
SELECT THE ACCEPTABLE
NUISANCE ALERT
RATE t
SELECT MINIMUM VALUE OF WIND SHEAR
THAT SHOULD TRIGGER AN ALERT.
(WIND SHEAR LEVELS BELOW THIS PRESENT
NO POTENTIAL HAZARD TO AIRPLANE)
SELECT THE WIND SHEAR BOUNDARIES
FOR WHICH THE FASTEST DETECTION TIME
IS DESIRED
COMPUTE FILTER'S PARAMETERS FOR
THE FASTEST DETECTION TIME
IS DETECTION TIME
SATISFACTORY?
I NO
I
I
YES
r
MUST ACCEPT
A HIGHER NUISANCE
ALERT RATE t
STOP
_p,d_,,C='lAV'_
4(>4
PROBABILITY DENSITY AND DISTRIBUTION
FOR PEAKS
1 dN(L)
Pp (L) = N(0)- dC
FOR A GAUSSIAN PROCESS:
Pp (L) - L2 exp
G F
(-L2/ 2_ 2 ) RALEIGH DENSITY FUNCTION
Pp(L) : 1- exp (-L2/ 2_ 2)
PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION FOR
PEAKS OF A GAUSSIAN PROCESS
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PROBABILITY OF NUISANCE ALERT
N (L)
PI(L, AT)
P2(L, AT )
PI= AT n(L)
P2 = 1-P1 =1- AT N(L)
= AVERAGE TIME DENSITY OF EVENTS
= PROBABILITY OF AN EVENT IN AT
= PROBABILITY OF NO EVENT IN AT
PROBABILITY OF NO EVENT IN
t n =nAT
P2 (L, tr0 = - -if- N(L)
n SUCCESSIVE INTERVALS :
FOR LARGE n:
P2 (L, tn) = exp (- t n N(L))
P1 (L, tn) = 1 - exp (- t n N(L)) PROBABILITY OF AN EVENTIN t
FOR A GAUSSIAN PROCESS:
PI(L" tn) = 1- exp (- t n N(0) exp (-
n
NOEJNO
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PC-Based Models
* Six Degrees of Freedom
* Control Surface Dynamics
* 3-D Wind Models
* Real Time I/O
* Takeoff/Roll Dynamics
* Instrument Error Models
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bSession II. Airborne-Flight Management
Crew Interface with Wind Shear Systems
Dave Carbaugh, Boeing
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An Expert System for Wind Shear Avoidance
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AN EXPERT SYSTEM FOR WIND SHEAR AVOIDANCE
Robert F. Stengel and D. Alexander Stratton
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
Princeton, New Jersey 08544
ABSTRACT
Flight in strong wind shears, especially microbursts, poses
a unique and severe hazard to aircraft. The disturbance caused
by the wind field may literally exceed the performance character-
istics of the aircraft, making safe transit impossible even with
optimal guidance and control strategies. An unusual degree of
piloting skill may be required to successfully elude danger.
Only the best pilots may be able to cope with strong wind shears,
but even they may be unable to safely penetrate extreme wind
shears. Nevertheless, planes fly in moderate wind shear all the
time; pilots learn to handle crosswinds, gustiness, and moderate
frontal activity. The problem is that microbursts are random,
rare phenomena: pilots do not develop the needed skills for
coping with wind shear through normal experience. The typical
pilot is likely to be confronted with a life-threatening wind
shear only once or twice in an entire flying career; hence, it is
unlikely that he or she can learn all the important signs of wind
shear and maintain a high level of proficiency in the proper con-
trol procedures.
On-board computation provides an excellent opportunity to
assist the pilot in surviving encounters with severe wind shears,
but the logic that must be executed in real time is complex and
must have sufficient inputs for framing decisions about appropri-
ate control actions. The computer program(s) and hardware to
perform this task must have attributes of expert systems and con-
trol systems, they must account for the limitations of aircraft
performance, and they must operate in real time. At least as
important as its technical specifications, the on-board system
must provide a satisfactory interface with the flight crew, which
bears the ultimate responsibility for assuring safety. This
means not only that the system must deduce near-optimal strateg-
ies and tactics for emergency situations but that it must dis-
tinguish between truly hazardous conditions and the more likely
alternatives associated with normal aircraft operations.
A program to investigate ways of protecting against the
adverse effects of wind shear during aircraft takeoffs and land-
ings has begun, with current emphasis on developing an expert
system for wind shear avoidance. Our principal objectives are to
_-'_i_.:.,._::.. _.:.,_:_ f'_OT FILMED
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develop methods for assessing the likelihood of wind shear
encounter (based on real-time information in the cockpit), for
deciding what flight path to pursue (e.g., takeoff abort, landing
go-around, or normal climbout or glide slope), and for using the
aircraft's full potential for combating wind shear. This study
requires the definition of both deterministic and statistical
techniques for fusing internal and external information, for
making "go/no-go" decisions, and for generating commands to the
aircraft's autopilot and flight directors for both automatic and
manually controlled flight.
The expert system for pilot aiding is based on the results
of the FAA Windshear Training Aids Program, a two-volume manual
that presents an overview, pilot guide, training program, and
substantiating data provides guidelines for this initial develop-
ment. The WindShear Safety Advisor expert system currently con-
tains over 140 rules and is coded in the LISP programming lang-
uage for implementation on a Symbolics 3670 LISP Machine.
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BACKGROUND
Flight in strong wind shears, especially microbursts, poses a unique and severe hazard to
aircraft. The disturbance caused by the wind field may literally exceed the performance
characteristics of the aircraft, making safe transit impossible even with optimal guidance and
control strategies. An unusual degree of piloting skill may be required to successfully elude
danger. Nevertheless, planes fly in moderate wind shear all the time; pilots learn to handle
crosswinds, gustiness, and moderate frontal activity. The problem is that microbursts are random,
rare phenomena; pilots do not develop the needed skills for coping with wind shear through normal
experience. The typical pilot is likely to be confronted with a life-threatening wind shear only once
or twice during an entire flying career; hence, it is unlikely that he or she can learn all the important
signs of wind shear and maintain a high level of proficiency in the proper control procedures.
On-board computation provides an excellent opportunity to assist the pilot in surviving
encounters with severe wind shears, but the logic that must be executed in real time is complex and
must have sufficient inputs for framing decisions about appropriate control actions. The computer
program(s) and hardware to perform this task must have attributes of expert systems and control
systems, they must account for the limitations of aircraft performance, and they must operate in
real time. At least as important as its technical specifications, the on-board system must provide a
satisfactory interface with the flight crew, which bears the ultimate responsibility for assuring
safety. This means not only that the system must deduce near-optimal strategies and tactics for
emergency situations but that it must distinguish between truly hazardous conditions and the more
likely alternatives associated with normal aircraft operations.
A _ogram to investigate ways of protecting against wind shear has begun at Princeton
University, with current emphasis on developing an expert system for wind shear avoidance. This
program is sponsored by the NASA Langley Research Center under Grant No. NAG- 1-384. Our
principal objectives are to develop methods for assessing the likelihood of wind shear encounter
(based on real-time information in the cockpit), for deciding what flight path to pursue (e.g., abort,
go-around, normal climbout, or glide slope), and for using the aircraft's full potential to combat
wind shear. This study requires the definition of deterministic and statistical techniques for fusing
internal and external information, for making "go/no-go" decisions, and for generating commands
to the aircraft's autopilot and flight directors in automatic and manually controlled flight.
The expert system for pilot aiding is based on results of the Integrated FAA Wind Shear
Program. Its two-volume manual presents an overview, pilot guide, Iraining program, and
substantiating data and provides guidelines for this initial development. The WindShear Safety
.Advisor currently contains over 140 rules and is coded in the LISP programming language for
Implementation on a Symbolics 3670 LISP Machine.
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BACKGROUND
Hazards of Low-Altitude Wind Shear
Difficulty of Maintaining Pilot Proficiency
Proper Decision-Making and Control Strategy
Enhances the Possibility of Avoidance and
Survival
Meteorological Studies
Sensor Development
Flight Path Optimization
Reactive and Predictive
Feedback Control
FAA Windshear Training Aid
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FAA WINDSHEAR TRAINING AID
The FAA Windshear Training Aid was prepared with the support of the
Integrated FAA Wind Shear Program. This two-volume manual was written by a
team from the airframe industry that interacted with airlines, government, and
academia. Principal results are expressed in a variety of ways for executive
review, training classes, and public information. One principal goal is to identify
the logical connections between pilot observations and pilot actions when wind
shear is encountered. The functions that a jet transport aircraft crew should
perform are summarized by a flow chart, as shown.
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WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
The WindShear Safety Advisor (WSA) is a computer program that uses
concepts drawn from the world of artificial intelligence (AI) to assess the wind
shear threat and to recommend safe piloting action. The current version is an
interactive but non-real-time program for studying the input information and
logic required to emulate and extend the FAA Windshear Training Aid to
on-board computer systems. In particular, the WSA implements the stated rules
of the Training Aid, and its development is uncovering the unstated (but critical)
implications of the manual. The WSA currently does not address important
human factors issues, such as presentation of information to the pilot and requests
for pilot input or intervention, which would have little significance in
non-real-time simulation. However, our goal is to identify a program structure
that is appropriate for real-time use.
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ISSUES in MONITORING
and RISK ASSESSMENT
Situational Awareness
Reporting of Threat Indicators
Diversity of lnformation Sources
Relevance to Intended Flight Path
Multiple Reports of Same Phenomenon
Known Limitations to
Target Parameter Selection
Runway length, obstacles
Aircraft performance
System malfunctions
Algorithms for Probability of
Wind Shear Encounter
LOW plus MEDIUM= HIGH?
Bayesian Logic, Fuzzy Sets?
Admonishment of
FAA Pilot Windshear Guide, page 36:
Use of Table I (Microburst Winsdshear Probability Guidelines)
should not replace sound judgement in making avoidance
decisions.
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ISSUES in MONITORING and RISK ASSESSMENT
The FAA Windshear Training Aid is a significant achievement in the fight
against the hazards of low-altitude wind shear; it identifies the major elements of
observational meteorology that can be linked with dangerous wind shears, and it
gives jet transport flight crews specific actions to take when wind shear encounter
is unavoidable. Nevertheless, it takes a high level of piloting awareness and skill
to evaluate the situation and to execute the implied actions correctly and quickly
enough to avert catastrophe. To the extent that a computer can be fast and
precise, it could assist the flight crew in this dangerous situation.
In seeking to build a computer aid fnr wind shear avoidance, it is necessary
to model the implied logical patterns that the flight crew must use and to quantify
subjective rules for computation. Many factors related to situational awareness,
limitations to effective action, and efficient decision analysis must be considered,
for the computer cannot exert "sound judgment " without having been
programmed to do so.
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FAA WINDSHEAR TRAINING AID
One Result of the Integrated FAA Wind Shear
Program ,Plan
Volume 1: Overview, Pilot Guide, and Training Program
Volume 2: Substantiating Data
Model of Flight Crew Actions
No
I Evaluate the Weather J_
1
I Avoid Known Windshear
I Consider Precautions 1
1
[ Follow StandardOperating Techniques J
#
Windshear Rec(;very Technique }
JL
r ........ -11
L _ _ _ _.the EncounterReport ..... j
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FAA WINDSHEAR TRAINING AID, continued
Flight crews are given information about the likelihood of dangerous wind
shear when certain observations are made. If the probability of wind shear is
LOW, standard procedures are recommended. If the probability is MEDIUM,
the crew is instructed to consider precautions, including delay or alteration of
terminal operations. If the probability is HIGH, delay or alteration of terminal
operations is recommended, with specifics actions guided by flight phase. If
more than observation suggests dangerous wind shear, the subjective probabilities
should be added, although the guidelines for the risk assessment and the
probability addition are imprecise. For example, two LOWs equal a MEDIUM,
and either two MEDIUMs or a LOW and a MEDIUM equal a HIGH. There is no
guidance regarding spatial or temporal characteristics of the observations; issues
of prox'maity and degree of intensity are left to the pilot's judgment.
Although the strongest suggestion for piloting strategy is "avoid, avoid,
avoid," recommended procedures for recovery or abort following wind shear
encounter are given as functions of flight phase. These strategies are
sub-optimal, but they materially enhance the probability of survival, in
comparison to standard piloting procedures.
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FAA WINDSHEAR TRAINING AID,
continued
OBSERVATION
PROBABILITY
OF WINDSHEAR
PRESENCE OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER NEAR INTENDED FLIGHT PATH:
- With 1ocalized strong winds (Tower reports or
observed b|owing dust, rings of dust,
tornado-llke features, etc.) ..........................
- With heavy precipitation (Observed or radar
indications of contour, red or attenuation shadow)....
- With ralnshower .......................................
- With ]Ightnlng........................................
- With vlrga ............................................
- With moderate or greater turbulence (reported or
radar Indlcatlons) ....................................
- With temperature/dew point _pread between
30 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit ..........................
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
ONBOARD WINDSHEAR DETECTION SYSTEM ALERT (Reported
or observed) .......................................... HIGH
PIREP OF AIRSPEED LOSS OR GAIN:
- 15 knots or greater .................................. HIGH
- Less than 15 knots .................................... MEDIUM
LLWAS ALERT/WIND V_LOCITY CHANGE
- 20 knots or greater ................,.................. HIGH
- Less than 20 knots .................................... MEDIUM
FORECAST OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER ............................... LOW
After Liftoff/On Approach Windshear
Recovery Technique
• THRUST
• Apply necessary thrust
•PITCH
• Adjust toward 15 °
• Increase beyond 15 ° if required to
ensure acceptable flight path
• Always respect stick shaker
• CONFIGURATION
• Maintain existing configuration
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WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
FAA Windshear Training Aid
Expansion to Include Implications
and Data Input/Output
Cockpit Simulation
On-Board Data
InertialSensors
Air Data Sensors
Weather Radar
Visual Observations
Look-Ahead Sensors
I_xternal Data
Weather Reports
Tower Reports
LLWAS
PIREPs
SIGMETs
NEXRAD
TDWR
WindShear
Safety
Advisor
Flight
Crew
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RULE-BASED SYSTEM for CONTROL
An on-board implementation of the WSA would be a Rule-Based Control
(RBC) system having attributes of both expert systems and conventional
eontroUers. In the parlance of AI, the Inference Engine executes the intelligence
of the system, drawing on the Data Base for information (in the form of
parameter values and properties) and on the Rule Base for logical relationships
(in the form of IF...THEN or PREMISE...ACTION statements). In "firing" the
rules, the Inference Engine may require that certain side tasks be accomplished,
such as taking measurements, making estimates, computing control settings, and
transferring commands to control effecters. Continuing the AI jargon, this
procedural, quantitative computation is done in a Side Effects Engine that calls on
both the Data Base and an Algorithm Base for its knowledge. (Measurement and
control are considered side effects of the request for information and the
decision-making process.)
Decision and control functions are readily separated in an RBC system, the
former calling for symbolic computation, the latter for numeric computation.
(In eithe,- case, the digital computer simply moves bits around; however,
interpretations of the logical operations are different.) Not surprisingly, some
computer programming languages are better than others at performing the two
types of tasks, so it is most efficient to use different languages for decision and
control during the development phase. For example, LISP is a good language for
developing logical relationships among strings of symbolic data, while Pascal or
FORTRAN is a good language for numerical computation. Consequently, LISP
is the language of choice for current WSA development.
Once decision and control functions have been defined, they must be
merged (in some sense) in the RBC system. It would be rare indeed for a given
application to need all the subtle features of either development language; thus a
single language can be used at the final step. Development of a real-time version
of an RBC system is thus aided by one or more language translators that
efficiently transform subsets of the development languages into the final code.
Experience with current compilers and computers indicates that procedural
languages like Pascal, FORTRAN, and C produce fast, concise target code for
both decision and control.
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RULE-BASED SYSTEM for CONTROL
COMMAND
KNOWLEDGE BASE
I RULE BASE
DATA BASE
I ALGORITHMBASE
I USER 1 DISPLAYINTERFACE
INFERENCE
ENGINE
SIDE EFFECTS 1ENGINE
CONTROL
MEASUREMENTS
Partitioning for
Decision and Control Functions
Integration of Symbolic and Numeric
Computation
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GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION of KNOWLEDGE
The elements of decision making needed for the WSA are illustrated by this
simple example. A parameter is a quantity that can have several values as well as
an array of complicated properties (not shown). A rule accepts one or more
parameters as its premise and performs the action of setting another parameter if
the values of its input parameters make the rule true. For the premise to be true,
it may be necessary that all multiple parameters take certain values (represented
by the arc between connecting lines), or it may be sufficient for any parameter to
take a certain value (represented by no arc between channels into the rule).
The example shown illustrates such a rule: Rule 1 says that IF the flight
phase is approach AND the aircraft is below a critical altitude AND a stable
glideslope has not been established, THEN the pilot should perform a go-around.
Rule 2 is the logical exclusion of Rule 1 and need not be implemented; it is here
just for demonstration. Note that the go-around decision proceeds from the rule;
in an array containing a number of such rules, setting parameters by moving
from the bottom up is called forward chaining. Sometimes a result is known and
it is necessary to determine what combination of parameters might have caused
the result. Answering this question requires backward chaining, that is, moving
through the rules from the top down. The WSA requires that both types of
chaining be used at different times.
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GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION
of KNOWLEDGE
PARAMETER
I_I_I._I NAME
>I>I>I
RULE
i
T ACTION Sets Values
ofParameters
RULENAME 1
//_PREMIS E ValuesTests
of Parameters
AND OR
EXAMPLE
APPROACH
RULE
1
60
AROUND
• BELOW
CRITICAL
ALTITUDE
Fo/"_rd
Chaining
i"
RULE t
2
GLIDESLOPE
NOT STABLE
iJ
,=ii.;.
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STRUCTURE of a RULE
The current version of WSA defines each role as a list in the computer
language called Common LISP. Thus, each rule is expressed as follows:
(name, premise, action, par-act, par-pre, translate)
The meaning of each list element is defined on the chart. The Inference Engine
effectively takes this list apart to find the needed inputs and outputs, performing
an IF...THEN operation on the appropriate parts.
531
NAME
PREMISE
ACTION
PAR-ACT
PAR-PRE
TRANSLATE
STRUCTURE of a RULE
Name of the Rule
Logical Relation of Parameters to
be tested by the Rule
Logical Result of Rule being TRUE
Parameters set by Action
Parameters tested in Premise
Documentation String for
Optional Display
•[Implemented as a Common LISP LIST ]
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RULE BASES of the WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
The current WSA version contains over 140 rules that set over 80
parameters. They are organized in the left-to-right hierarchy shown, addressing
the functions defined by the FAA Windshear Training Aid.
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RULE BASES of the
WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
Executive
Mission Phase
Communication
Wind Shear Alert
Wind Shear Detection
Flight Path Deviation
Risk Assessment
PIREP-LLWAS
ATIS-SIGMET
Generic Weather Risk
Heavy Precipitation
Rainshower
Lightning
Virga
Turbulence
Action
Standard Procedures
Recovery Procedures
Go-Around Procedures
Delay Procedures
Planning
Runway
Airspeed
Flaps
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STRUCTURE of a PARAMETER
The parameters of the WSA currently are defined as Common LISP
variables. There are different classes of parameters, defined by how and when
their values are determined. A variable has the value current, to which is
appended a property list containing (use, update, expect, translate), defined in the
chart.
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STRUCTURE of a PARAMETER
Parameter Classifications
INTERNAL
PRESET
STATE
OUTSIDE
Parameter is internal to the Expert System;
Value defined by a Goal-Directed Search
Parameter is set by Initialization
Parameter is set by an Estimator
Parameter is set outside the Expert System
Parameter Properties
CURRENT
USE
UPDATE
EXPECT
TRANSLATE
Current Value of the Parameter
Rules that Use the Parameter
Rules that Set the Parameter
Allowable Values of the Parameter
Description of the Parameter for
Optional Display
[Implemented as a Common LISP VARIABLE ]
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EXAMPLE PARAMETERS of the WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
Names of some of the WSA parameters are shown and are, for the most
part, self-explanatory. Each parameter may represent not only a symbolic or
numerical value but a list that further defines its properties. Therefore, the
Inference Engine can readily identify parameters that have certain attributes, in
turn, aidi_,: the searches associated with monitoring, assessment, planning, and
action.
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EXAMPLE PARAMETERS of the
WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
Communication Rule Base
New-information-received
Incident-reported
Tower-informed-goa
Tower-informed-delay
Precautions-taken
Flight Path Deviation Rule Base
Target-airspeed
Airspeed-deviati0n
Max-airspeed-deviation
Agl-at-max-speed-deviation
Target-vertical-speed
V erti cal- speed-de via tion
Outside Parameters
PIREP
LLWAS
Dispatch-office
ATIS
ASWW
SIGMET
Onboard-radar
Tower-report
TDWR
Wind-profiler
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LABORATORY for CONTROL and AUTOMATION
Development of the WindShear Safety Advisor is being conducted within
the Princeton University Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineedng's
Laboratory for Control and Automation. The laboratory has a broad variety of
computational tools that are appropriate to research in artificial intelligence,
computer-aided design, flight dynamic_ and digital control. A real-time expert
system for fault-tolerant control of a tandem-rotor helicopter has been
implemented in the laboratory using three 80286 MULTIBUS computer boards
for execution. Current WSA development makes use of the LISP Machine, which
employs Common LISP for the expert system and FORTRAN for flight
simulation.
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LABORATORY for
CONTROL and AUTOMATION
Symbolics 3670 LISP Machine
Silicon Graphics IRIS 3020 Workstation
Macintosh II
IBM PS-2/80
IBM PC-AT (2)
IBM PC/XT (2)
Lab-wide Ethemet Connection (TCP/IP)
Broadband Connection to IBM 3081s
and ETA 10 s
Portable and Fixed MULTIBUS
Computers (5)
Fixed-Base Cockpit Simulator
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DEVELOPMENT SCREEN for WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
A typical LISP Machine display for WSA development is shown. The
program developer uses a mouse to invoke features listed on the menu line and
types information into the User Interaction Pane (or window). Parameters that
change as a result of WSA activity are highlighted in the Parameter Information
Pane, while the overall behavior of the expert system can be followed in the
Result Monitoring Pane. This display is not intended as a prototype cockpit
display but as an engineering tool for concept and program development.
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DEVELOPMENT SCREEN
for
WINDSHEAR SAFETY ADVISOR
Princeton WindShear Safety Advisor Interface
Flight Plan Get Value Of Make Message Presets .........L'_lenuLine)
User Interaction Pane Parameter Information Pane
• Messages to program
developer
• Messages to creJ.J._,tower, etc..
• Data and commands from
program developer
Result Monitoring Pane
• Parameters that have changed
values
• Otherparameters of interest
• Executive observations
• Monitored information
• Status assessment
• Planning activity
• Recommended action
• Current airport weather
LISP Machine Implementation
for Concept/Program Development
Interface to FORTRAN
Flight Simulation
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CONCLUSION
The WindShear Safety Advisor program implements the stated
decision-making logic of the FAA WindshearTraining Aid, as well as a set of
unstated implications that are necessary for practical application. The WSA
expert system contains over 140 roles that set over 80 parameters for terminal
or_rations of jet transport aircraft. Future modifications will account for spatial
and temporal variations of the aircraft and its meteorological environment, as
well as for interfaces with the air traffic control system. The WindShear Safety
Advisor sets the stage for cockpit simulation of logic for wind shear avoidance,
which, in turn, will lead to practical systems for operational aircraft.
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CONCLUSION
Logic of Wind Shear Avoidance
Computer Aiding for Crew Decisions
Spatial and Temporal Factors
Off-Line and On-Line Simulation
Interfaces with Sensors, Aircraft,
and Crew
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ABSTRACT
A simulation of a Boeing 727 aircraft during acceleration
on the runway is used to determine the effect of windshear on
stopping distance. Windshears of various magnitudes, dura-
tions, and onset times are simulated to assess the aircraft
performance during an aborted takeoff on five different runway
surfaces. A windshear detection system, active during the
takeoff roll and similar to the Honeywell Windshear Detection
System is simulated to provide a discrete to activate aircraft
braking upon shear detection.
The results of the simulation indicate that several fac-
tors affect the distance required to stop the aircraft. Nota-
ble among these are gross weight, takeoff flap position, run-
way characteristics, and pilot reaction time. Of the wind-
shear parameters of duration, onset and magnitude, magnitude
appears to have the most significant effect.
INTRODUCTION
Low-level windshears have proven to be one of the most
significant threats to aircraft safety. Several aircraft
accidents have been directly attributed to the phenomenon,
and, as a result, considerable progress has been made in the
understanding of the atmospheric mechanisms, methodology of
detection, and the control of the aircraft's flight path dur-
ing a shear encounter.
The research has also resulted in the development of sev-
eral on-board systems which have been certified by the FAA and
are currently in use. These systems have proven effective in
detecting the presence of a windshear and, in at least two
cases, have been instrumental in the successful escape from an
encountered windshear.
One aspect of the windshear problem which has not been
adequately addressed, however, is the effect of windshear on
the aircraft during takeoff roll: the time between the initial
acceleration of the aircraft on the runway and lift off. Sev-
eral cases of windshear encounters during the takeoff roll are
known, the most notable being the incident of United Airlines
Flight 663 at Stapleton International Airport on May 31, 1984.
In this instance the aircraft, a Boeing 727, encountered the
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localizer antenna located 1074 feet (327 m) beyond the depar-
ture end of the runway. Fortunately, no injuries occurred,
but substantial damage was done to the aircraft.
If a flight crew is aware of a windshear condition prior
to obtaiming the critical engine failure speed, Vl, they may
elect to either abort the takeoff or to continue on through
rotatio, and lift off. V 1 is thus a "go,no-go" speed which is
generally determined by the aircraft's ability to stop within
the remaining runway distance. V 1 is defined as a calibrated
airspeed and thus differs from the actual ground speed of the
aircraft by the magnitude of the wind. Consequently, the
attainment of V 1 in a windshear condition does not necessarily
assure that the aircraft can be safely stopped on the runway
since the ground speed, and hence the kinetic energy of the
aircraft, can be significantly higher than normal. The addi-
tional kinetic energy of the aircraft may result in a substan-
tial increase in the required runway to safely stop the air-
craft should the flight crew elect to abort the takeoff.
If the windshear is detected after obtaining Vl, the
takeoff must be continued in most cases as the available run-
way to stop the aircraft is usually insufficient.
This paper addresses the problem of windshear occurring
during takeoff roll by simulating an aircraft in various mag-
nitudes, durations, and onset times of windshears, at differ-
ent aircraft weights, and on different runway surfaces.
SIMULATION CONFIGURATION
A Boeing 727 aircraft was simulated on an Epson Equity
III+ computer as a three degree of freedom model with an
effective one-quarter second computational rate. Lift and
drag were computed from curve fits of actual aircraft data
with the assumption made that angle of attack, alpha, is con-
stant during the ground roll. Ground effect on lift and drag
were included in the simulation.
Thrust was computed from curve fits of Thrust/Delta versus
_Mach number for a fixed takeoff engine pressure ratio (EPR).
_he engines simulated were Pratt and Whitney JT8D-15 engines
To simulate engine spool down, a simple lag filter was uti-
lized. Engine thrust reversers were not simulated.
The lift and drag effect of ground speedbrakes was simu-
lated with the assumption that the ground speedbrakes achieve
maximum deployment within 1 second.
The aircraft's antiskid system was simulated by assuming
60% efficiency in achievingthe maximum coefficient of fric-
tion available for the runway surface.
Five runway surfaces were simulated: (a) dry surface; (b)
wet, grooved asphalt; (c) wet, grooved concrete; (d) wet, tex-
tured asphalt; and (e) wet, textured concrete. The dry sur-
face coefficient of friction was applicable to either asphalt
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or concrete. Coefficients of friction were derived from curve
fits of available data and are shown on Figure 7.
Windshear models available were a linear horizontal shear
and a vortex microburst model. The former was used for the
simulation runs since it allowed more precise control of shear
onset, magnitude, and duration.
The runway altitude was sea level for all cases and the
ambient temperature assumed to be standard day, 59 degrees F
(15 degrees C). The runway was assumed to have zero slope.
No explicit pilot model was necessary as braking is done
by the antiskid system; however, recognition delays were
incorporated to approximate pilot response. For all runs
except those directed at pilot recognition time, the delay
used was 1 second.
AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
The simulated flap setting for most takeoffs was 15
degrees, the most common setting for this aircraft. Aircraft
weight could be varied, but, as might be expected, the heavy
weight aircraft was most severely affected by the shears. To
achieve worst case conditions, the aircraft weight was set at
210,000 pounds (95254 Kg). Other runs, not included in this
paper, were conducted at 140,000 pounds (63503 Kg) and 175,000
pounds (79378 Kg).
SIMULATION RUNS
The aircraft was initialized at the end of the runway with
full takeoff power set and brakes applied. At the start of
the run, the brakes were released and the aircraft allowed to
accelerate.
The simulated runway was infinitely long to preclude the
complexity of altering aircraft weight and flap setting to
produce a balanced field length. In this way, the worst case
aircraft weight could be used throughout the runs.
TO provide baseline data in no shear conditions, an
aborted takeoff was performed when the aircraft achieved V I.
Following the recognition delay, the thrust was reduced to
idle, the ground speed brakes deployed, and the antiskid sys-
tem activated to provide braking. The total runway used thus
provided a baseline value for comparing the effect of a wind-
shear.
RUNWAY SURFACE TYPES
As windshears may or may not be accompanied by rain, it is
important to assess the aircraft's performance on both dry and
wet runways. A wet runway is assumed to have from 0 to .5
inch ( 1.27 cm) of standing water. The type of runway surface
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can also have significant effects on braking performance.
Consequently, the studies used grooved and textured asphalt
and concrete runways. For convenience, mnemonics were used
for the runway types according to Table i:
Table 1
Mnemonic Runway Surface
DRY
GVD ASPH
GVD CONC
TEX ASPH
TEXCONC
Dry Asphalt or Concrete
Wet, Grooved Asphalt
Wet, Grooved Concrete
Wet, Textured Asphalt
Wet, Textured Concrete
EFFECT OF FLAPS ON STOPPING DISTANCE
The flight crew's selection of takeoff flaps significantly
alters the amount of runway required to stop the aircraft. The
total runway required to accelerate the aircraft to V 1 and
then come to a complete stop using the available takeoff flap
settings for the Boeing 727 is shown on Figure I.
Clearly, the flap setting of 25 degrees provides the minimum
runway usage. This is primarily because V 1 for 25 degrees of
flaps is significantly lower than the others. Consequently,
the aircraft achieves V 1 with lower runway usage and also has
a lower kinetic energy.
However, consideration must be given to aircraft perfor u
mance once airborne in the event the flight crew elects to
continue the takeoff. For the Boeing 727, for example, a flap
setting of 15 degrees is preferred for airborne performance
and consequently, 15 degrees should be used as a compromise
between stopping distance and airborne performance.
As the incremental runway distance between a flap setting
of 5 degrees and 15 degrees is significantly more than that
between flap settings of 15 and 25 degrees, one must conclude
that a flap setting of 5 degrees for takeoff should not be
used if windshear is suspected.
EFFECT OF WINDSHEAR ONSET
To assess the effect of shear onset time on stopping dis-
tance, a constant shear of 5 knots per second (2.57 m/sec/sec)
was introduced at specified points as the aircraft acceler-
ated. The shear, once started, was of infinite duration.
Upon detection and recognition of the shear, the takeoff was
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aborted. As can be seen in Figure 2, the total runway used in
most cases was less than or equal to the distance for the no
shear case. The times on the Figure indicate the time of
shear onset as measured from initial brake release.
In the cases where shear onset occurred slightly before
obtaining V I speed, the total runway usage was increased, but
not dramatically so.
EFFECT OF WINDSHEAR DURATION
The effect of the duration of several shears of different
magnitudes was investigated to determine the increase in total
runway used in coming to a complete stop. In each case, the
onset of the shear was at approximately 10 knots before V 1
speed. Figure 3 illustrates the results. The ordinate axis
yields the total runway used in thousands of feet. The magni-
tude of the shear used was 5 knots per second. For the dry
runway or wet, grooved runways the additional runway used is
virtually independent of shear duration.
For the wet, textured asphalt or concrete runway, notice-
able increases in runway used are evident. However, once the
duration of the shear exceeds 15 seconds, the total runway
used is approximately constant, leading one to conclude that
shear duration is not a prime consideration except on textured
surfaces.
EFFECT OF WINDSHEAR MAGNITUDE
A series of runs was conducted in which the shear onset,
detection, and reaction coincided with attaining V 1. After
onset, the shear was sustained indefinitely. Figure 4 illus-
trates the results of the simulation runs. The ordinate axis
gives runway distance in thousands of feet.
The data indicate that shear magnitude is not of prime
concern for the dry or wet, grooved surfaces. Significant
increases in total distance used are evident in the wet, rex-
,lured surfaces, however.
EFFECT OF UNDETECTED WINDSHEARS
As of the time of this writing, no on-board system is
available that will detect a shear during takeoff roll,
although one such system is now in the certification process.
Conse_uently, it is left to the flight crew to determine
whether or not a windshear is present during takeoff ro11. The
detection of such shears can be difficult since the aircraft
is accelerating and the shear may be accompanied by turbu-
lence. I_ the simulation runs, the magnitudes of the shears
were intentionally made small to simulate shears that might go
unnoticed by the flight crew. The onset of the shears occurred
approximately I0 knots before v I speed and the shear was then
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maintained indefinitely. When the aircraft achieved V 1 speed,
it was braked to a full stop and the total runway used noted.
A graph of total runway used versus shear magnitude is shown
on Figure 5. Undetected shear magnitudes of 2 knots per sec-
ond or less have profound effects on the total runway used,
particularly for the heavy weight aircraft. This is a
consequence of shear causing a low air mass acceleration
which, in turn, causes v I speed to be achieved much further
down the runway than normally.
EFFECT OF PILOT RECOGNITION
To assess the effect of a recognition delay in reacting to
a detected shear condition, simulation runs were made with
reaction delays of 0, I, 2, 3, 4, and 5 seconds. The results
of the runs are shown on Figure 6. In these cases, a 5 knot
per second infinite shear began at V I. The reaction time
represents the number of seconds between detection of the
shear and the pilot reaction of reducing thrust, braking, and
deploying the ground speed brakes. As can be seen, the
effects are dramatic, particularly for the longer delay times.
On the average, about 4% more runway is used for each addi-
tional second of delay, regardless of the surface type.
CONCLUSIONS
The data indicate that flap setting, runway surface type,
and pilot recognition time are all prime factors in determin-
ing total runway used. A worst case scenario for this air-
craft would be heavy gross weight with 5 degree takeoff flaps
on a wet, textured concrete runway. A long recognition time
further aggravates the situation.
Consequently, one may conclude that the largest possible
takeoff flap setting consistent with good airborne performance
should be used. For the 727 aircraft, this is a flap setting
of 15 degrees.
Timely pilot recognition and reaction to a windshear con-
dition on takeoff should and can be reenforced by simulator
training. As mentioned above, approximately 4% more runway is
used for each second of pilot reaction time. It is difficult
to overemphasize the necessity for rapid response to a wind-
shear condition, particularly if the takeoff is to be aborted.
It is interesting that windshears occurring on dry; wet,
grooved asphalt; and wet, grooved concrete runways have such a
small effect on braking performance. With a shear magnitude
of 5 kt/sec occurring at Vl, typical increases in required
distance were of the order of i%.
The effect of ungrooved runway surfaces, however, is sig-
nificant. A 5 kt/sec shear encountered at V 1 increases the
total runway usage by almost 12% for a wet, textured concrete
surface. The corresponding number for the asphalt runway is
5.4%. It should be noted also, however, that an aircraft on a
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wet, textured concrete runway requires about 46% more distance
to stop even without a windshear than would be needed if the
runway surface were dry.
The effect of shear onset and shear duration did not
appear to seriously affect the aircraft's braking performance.
Of the detected shears, shear magnitude seemed most signifi-
cant in terms of braking distance.
Undetected shears resulted in large increases in runway
required - up to 56%. However, it is unlikely that the pilot
would elect to abort in these cases. It is also unlikely that
a low level shear would be sustained for long periods of time;
The simulations did provide an indication of the importance of
shear detection on the runway, however.
It is important to note that the effect of Windshear
Detection System delays were not included in the analysis.
Detection delays due to computation and filtering can add
appreciably to the total runway used in a windshear condition.
The effect of the delays is comparable to the pilot reaction
delays discussed in the paper: for each second of delay time,
up to 4% more runway may be required to stop the aircraft.
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AIRPORT BASIC E@UIPMENT
TECHNICAL CONTROL AND AERONAUTICAL EDUCATION
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mRULEMAKING STUDY ON &#INDSHEAR MODELING
• MAIN OBJECTIVES OF RULEMAKING STUDIES
CARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY
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HAINOBJECTIVES oF RULENAKIN_ STUDIES.
I
• CERTIFICATION OF CIVIL AERONAUTICAL MATERIAL IS A FUNCTION OF FRENCH STATE
• NECESSITY TO ELABORATE TECHNICAL RULES (AIRWORTHINESS CODE, QUALIFICATION
NTthNI)iUtDS, MEANS OF CONFORMITY OR INTERPRETATION TEX_S) THAT ARE RECOCNIZED
BOTH BY MANUFACTURERS AND FOREICN AUTHORITIES
• NEED FOR LIVE RULES
• NEED TO OPTIMIZE THE COSTS OF NECESSARY JUSTIFICATION
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CARACTERISTICSOF THE STUDY
n NOTIFICATION OF THE STUDY BY A CONTRACT BETWEEN DGAC/STPA AND
AEROSPATIALE/CEV SIGNED AT THE END OF YEAR 87
• OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY IS TO DEFINE AN ACCEPTABLE SET OF WINDSHEAR MODEL FOR
CERTIFICATION PURPOSES (SATISFACTORY MEANS OF COMPLIANCE)
• STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY CONSISTS IN:
• A COMPARATIVE THEORETICALSTUDY BY AEROSPATIALE
• A COMPARATIVE SIMULATOR STUDY BY AEROSPATIALE WITH HELP OF CEV
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COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL STUDY
1 I
IT CONSISTS OF A CHOICE AMONG DIFFERENT WINDMODELS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE:
* AC 2@-57A AND AC 12e-41
* FAA RD 74-2e6
" HISTORICAL GRADIENTS
" RAE DETERMINIST DOWNBURST
* RAE NON DETERMINIST DO_NBURST
* JAWS B1-85
AFTER EXAMINATION OF:
* BANDE WIDTH
* TURBULENCE STANDARD DEVIATION LEVEL
* FIELD LENGTH COMPARED TO COMPUTER CAPACITY
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IDENTIFICATION
i AC.120-41 champ 4- - 6
SEVERE A BASSE
ALTITUDE
÷÷÷÷
÷÷÷÷
AC-120-41 champ 7
AC-120-41 champ 9 +
AC-120-41 champ 10 + + + ÷
HISTORIOUE CO 426 DEN
HISTORIQUE U,_L 209 ORD
HISTORIQUE EA 66 JFK
HISTORIQUE DAL 191 OFW
HISTORIQUE TWA 524 LGA
18h45 along-path AB
JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982. 18h45' along-path CD
JAWS" AUGUST 5, 1982, 18h45 along-path YZ
I JAWS AUGUST 5. 1982. 18h45 along-path IJ
JAWS" AUGUST 5. 1982, 18h45 along.path KL
i'8h45 along-path GH
+÷÷÷
÷÷÷÷
÷÷÷÷
÷÷÷÷
++÷÷
SEVERE A HAUTi'E.
ALTITUDE
i i
÷ ,i- + ÷
i i
÷
,4-
÷÷÷÷
=,.
•t- ÷ ÷ ÷
÷÷÷÷
HISTORIQUE EA 693 ATL + + +
,i
HISTORIQUE PA 759 MSY + + +
jAWS AUGUST 5, 1982. + ÷
÷
.,I-
°
JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982, . ÷
- JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982. . + +18h47 along-path AS
18h47 along-path CO
i JAWS
JAws AUGUST 5, 1982. 18h47 along-path KL
- JAWS'AUGUST'5, 1982. 18h47 along-path GH
JAWS' AUGusT 5, 1982, 18h50 along-path AB
JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982,
JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982, 18h47 along-path YZ
AUGUST 5, 1982. 18h47 along-path IJ ÷
• ii ,
JAWS AU_'UST 5, 1982, 18h50 along-path CO
JAWS AUGUST 5. 7982, 18h50 along-path YZ
JAWS AUGUST 5. 1982. 18h50 along-path U
18h50 along-path KL
÷
÷
I JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982, 18h52 along-path CD
! JAws AUGUST 5, 1982, 18h52 along-path YZ
[ JAWS" AUGUST 5, 1982. 1'8hS2' along-path IJ
[ JAWS AUGUST 5. 1982. 18h52 along-path KL
i' JAWS _UGUST 5, 1982, 18h52 along.path GH
d-÷
÷
÷
°
÷ d,,.
JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982.
JAWS AUGUST 5, 1982, 18h50 along-path GH
J
JAWS AUGUST S, 1982, 18h52 along-path AB . ÷ +
severitd insignifiante
sdveritd faible
severite moyenne
580
BASSE ALTITUDE • <= 500 t't
÷
HAUTE ALTITUDE " • 500 ft ÷ +
÷ ÷
,i
,,i , ii
÷ ÷ ÷
÷÷÷4,
$_verite forte
s_ivedta tr&s forte
JAWS
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982, 18h21 along-path MN
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982, 18h21 =long-path PQ
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982. 18h21 aJong-path RS
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982, 18h23 along-path EF
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982. 18h23 =long-I:_th MN
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982, 18h23 along-path PQ
JAWS JUNE 30. 1982, 18h23 along-path RS
JAWS JUNE 30, lg82, 18h26 along-path EF
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IDENTIFICATION
JUNE 30, 1982, 18h21 along-path EF
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982, 18h26 along-path MN
JAWS JUNE 30, 1982, 18h26 along-path PQ
JUNE 30. 1982, 18h26 along-path RS
SEVERE A BASSE
ALTITUDE
6
SEVERE A HAUTE
ALTITUDE
4-
i
i i
4"
i
,4-4-
i
JAWS . -
JAWS JULY 14. 1982, 14h52 along-path TU . +
JAWS JULY 14. 1982, 14h52 along-path VW + +
JAWS JULY 14, 1982, 14h52 along-path OX + +
JAWS JULY 14, 1982, 14h52 along-path LS +
BASSE ALTITUDE • <= 500 ft
+
.HAUTE ALTITUDE " • 500 ft ÷ +
sdveritd insignifiante + + +
sevedte faible + + + +
severite rnoyenne
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severite forte
sdverite tres forte
COMPARATIVE SIMULATOR STUDY
I
• ON A COMPUTER
• ON A FBS A300-600 WITHOUT ENVIRONMENT AND CABIN MOTION, DETECTION OF
WINDSHEAR BEING COMPLETED BY OBSERVATION OF TENDANCY BARS OF SPEED VECTOR
• PLUS A STUDY ON A CEV SIMULATOR (CALLED MBS) WITH MOTION AND EXTERNAL
VISUALISATION
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HB8 SI_JDY
• UTILIZATION OF RIND MODELS
• PRELIMINARY STUDIES
RESULTS
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UTILIZATION OF WIND MODELS
. __ I !
• HISTORICAL MODELS:
w WIND PROJECTIONS ARE ONLY FUNCTIONS OF DISTANCE ALONG THE
RUNWAY AXIS
* USE OF THESE MODELS IS ONLY POSSIBLE ALONG THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY
Z OTH__ (AC 12@-41, JAWS el-85, TEORETICAJ. DOWNBURST)
* WIND PROJECTION ARE ONLY FUNCTIONS OF DISTANCE ALONG THE RUNWAY AXIS AND
HEIGHT ABOVE RUNWAY
* THIS MEANS THAT MORE THAN ONE TRAJECTORY ARE FEASIBLE, ESPECIALLY FOR
TAKE-OFF
I SPECIFIC TRAJECTORIES:
* BETTER THAN NOTION OF FIELDS WOULD BE AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORIES THROUGH THOSI
FIELDS
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PRELIMINARY STUDIES
I
• OBJECTIVES:
THE AIM IS TO DETERMINE HOW TURBULENCE ON ONE SIDE,.HOW THE MEANS'OF
SIMULATION ONTHE OTHER SIDE, HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE CREW BEHAVIOUR AND ON
THEIR JUDGMENT
w THIS MEANS
- AC@UIRE A PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE ON THE MEANS
- REDUCE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TESTS BY DEFINING IDEAL CONDITIONS OF TESTING
• CONDITIONS OF TESTING:
FOR DETECTION, NO ALARM IS PROVIDED
FOR ESCAPE, AN ALARM IS DEFINED BY A DISTANCE, IN ORDER TO AVOID TOO LARGE
A DISPERSION OF THE POINTS _IHERE ESCAPES ARE PERFORMED
BEFORE EACH TEST, CONDITIONS ARE SET UP
AFTER EACH TEST, THE CREW FULLFILLS A @UESTIONARY
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@UESTIONARY ON WIND MODEL @UALIFICATION
-- _ - m _ iii I
1. DETECTION
1.1.
a) With alarm: depending of the piloting informations provided, do you think
the alarm has appeared:
1 - too soon
2 - on time
3 - too late
b) Informations being used for detection: (instruments, external.
visualisation, motion... )
1.2. Entering the gradient (just before applying escape procedure), the
situation has appeared:
A (very critical): immediat danser, necessary reaction to be very urgent;
B (critical) : actual danger, necessary reaction to be urgent;
C alarming) : forecasted danger; the degradation of the performance,
although non critical, is unacceptable
D (abnormal) : but not alarming; the degradation of the performance is
acceptable;
E (normal) : comparable to a current variation of the wind;
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2._sc_P_
2.1. Piloting capacity during escape:
a) longitudinal: ease of procedure 0 - 17"5
A: very difficult
B: difficult
C: mean difficult
D: little difficult
E: easy
b) lateral: influence of the lateral shear on the longitudinal procedure:
A: very disturbing
B: disturbing
C: little disturbing
D: very little disturbing
E: unexistant
2.2 Global crew workload (data surveillance...)
A: very high
8: high
C: reasonable
D: mean
E: normal
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2.3. Duration feeling in relation with the concentration effort
A: very long duration
B: long duration
C: mean duration
D: short duration
E: very short duration
2.4. Uncapacity feeling during escape manoeuver (short term)
A: very high, parameters within the critical zone, situation getting
worse
B: high, parameters within the critical zone, stable situation
C: mean, parameters within the critical zone, situation getting better
D: low, abnormal but not critical values o£ vl and V2
E: nul
2.5. Danger feeling durind escape _noeuver (danger being ground proximity or
stall)
A: very high
B: high
c: mean
D: low
E: nul
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RESULTS
• LIMITS
* AIRCRAFT MODEL
* FLIGHT CONTROLS
* PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT
*DIFFERENT WAYS OF PILOTING THE PHENOMENOM
MOVEMENT
4,TURBULENCE
I ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS IMC/VMC
• EFFECT OF TURBULENCE
INSTRUMENTA[ION
589
NEXTTO COME
• FROM THE STUDY
• FINALIZATION OF AEROSPATIALE RESULTS
• UTILIZATION OF A HUD
• BI-TURBOPROPELLER SIMULATION
• OTHER STUDIES
• DEFINITION OF AN ACCEPTAflLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE FOR A DETECTION AND GUIDANCE
EWUIPMENT
* OP_ERATIONAL RULES ASSESSMENT WITH AND U_THOUT AUTOMATIC _UIDANCE SYSTEM FOR
A38e/A38@-600/A31@/A32e
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Session II. Airborne-Flight Management
Wind Shear Predictive Detector Technology Study Status
C. Gandolfi, DGAC/STNA/3E
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N91-.11700
* "
. Presentation of French Civil Aviation Technical Service
at
(C. GANDOLFI from DGAC/STNA/3E) .
Second Combined Manufacturers' and Technology Airborne
Wind Shear Review Meetinq, Williamsburg October 18-20, 1988
I) Introduction :
Among the different elements to be investigated when
considering the Wind Shear hazard, STNA/3E [I], whose task is
to participate in the development of new technologies and
equipments, focused its effort on airborne and ground sensors
for the detection of low-level wind shear.
The first task, initiated in 1986, consists in the
evaluation of three candidate technics for forward-looking
sensors : LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging), SODAR (Sound
Wave Detection And Ranging) and RADAR.
No development is presently foreseen for an infrared
based air turbulence advance warning system although some
flight experiments took place in the 70's. A Thomson_CSF
infrared radiometer was then installed on an Air France Boeing
707 to evaluate its capability of detecting clear air
turbulence. The conclusion showed that this technic was
apparently able to detect clouds layers but that additional
experiments were needed; on the other hand, the rarity of the
phenomenon and the difficulty to operate on a commercial
aircraft were also mentionned.
II) LIDAR program :
Laser technology is the only one that
studied for an airborne forward-looking sensor.
is presently
i) The first step of the LIDAR program consisted in a
preliminary contract with the CR©UZET company. This task
initiated in may 1987 was completed by february 1983.
It consisted in the following elements :
*investigation of operational objectives in terms
of functional specifications and system design
requirements : altitude and range of measurez_ent,
speed range, envircn_en_al constraints (weather,
installation .... ) ....
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*ground experiments with• an existing mock,up
sponsored by military contracts for anemometry
purposes. This equipment is based on a continuous.
laser beam (10,6 _m), with a 75 mm telescope
focusing between I0 and I00 m; the speed sign can
be detected and measures around zero (± 0,25 m/s)
are possible.
*evaluation for both adaptations : ground and
onboard detector.
I.I : Airborne wind shear detection :
General requirements :
The warning criteria recommended by the
CROUZET company proceeds in two steps :
*a pre-alarm advisory for an increasing
headwind of 40 ft/s combined with an upward vertical
component;
*an alarm announce for a tailwind of 40 ft/s
associated with a vertical downdraft.
The proposed technical requirements are the
following ones :
*Radial speeds range from 60 to 240 knots
(assuming aircraft speed between'f20 and 130 knots and a wind
variation of ± 60 knots);
*Velocity resolution : ± 3 knots;
*Look-ahead range of 700 m (I0 s warning
time) with a range resolution _ 300 m;
*Estimation of the vertical wind inferred
from radial speed measurements in two spatially shifted
locations;
*Lateral exploration by a conical scanning
steered at I0 ° from flight path. "Left lateral", "right
lateral", "up ...., down" components would be delivered with an
update rate of approximately 1 s;
*Environmental constraints as defined in
RTCA-DOI60-B.
The resulting information presented to the
pilot would be the radial velocity (Vx) ,an estimation of the
vertical component (Vz) and the lateral shifting of the
perturbation (Vx right and Vx left).
Two technologies are proposed by the CROUZET
company :
_at first, a mock-up based on a continuous
COz laser source (10,6 Dm) with a MTBF (Mean Time Between
Failure) of I000 hours;
*in the future, for operational systems, a
solid-state laser (2,1 Dm) with a MTBF of 5000 hours, an half
size optical diameter, a classical thermal regulation.
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• Future studies proposals :
*The first idea was to proceed with flight
•experiments of the existing mock-up where a 200 mm telesc6pe
would have been adapted in order to focus at 570 m
(measurement volume between 420 m and 720 m) using Conical
scanning of 1 s and beam steering of i0 °. The aim was to
collect data on Vx laser, Vz laser, the difference between
laser speed and aircraft speed, and spectra. This program
didn't appear efficient enough since the technological options
were not clearly defined at this stage. It seemed necessary to
precisely identify the theoretical environment before carrying
out expensive flight tests.
*Consequently, a second program plan w_s
considered on the basis of flight tests supported by
theoretical tasks and simulations. However, since, the main
technological choices (type of laser, optical diameter .... )
had to be fixed through simulation investigations, it was
decided to delay the experimental phase.
The preliminary theoretical part was
delegated to the ONERA research laboratory [2] because of its
experience in detectors, aircraft simulators, aerodynamics,
and its relationships with meteorologists as well as with
people from the National Flight Test Center "CEV" [3]. Another
point is that an equivalent method combining a theoretical
part carried out by a research center and a realization
through a mock-up designed by a manufacturer proved successful
for the anemometry prototype (cooperation O_IERA/CROUZET).
ONERA program plan :
The contract concerning the OUEEA
participation is presently to be debated but preliminary
guidelines have been identified in terms of an initial study
to start with. It concerns :
*the windshear models :
-implementation of the existing FAA models
-adaptation of new parameters Specific to
laser detection such as variations of the
backscattered signal, absorption, rain and
fog attenuation ....
*simulations with different types of laser
sensors : continuous CO_ source with or
without modulation, pulsed laser, optical
diameter ....
1.2 : Ground-based wind shear detection :
General requirements :
The operational requirements as defined by
CROUZET assume a coverage until I000 ft tha_ is considered to
be the minimum safe altitude to monitor take-off (6 ° ) and
landing (3 ° ) flight paths.
From the various constraints (length and
width of runway, lateral shifting of microburst, warning tirze
of I0 s), a minimum range of 7,5 Km is required for a ground
sensor located at the center of the runaway and alterr_atively
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scanning departure and arrival flight paths. According to the
cost and availibility of technology, an alternate solution can
consistof two systems focusing at 2400 m (measurement volume
between 40 m and 3400 m). The spatial resolution must be _
better than 300 m for a range of speed of ± 60 knots with a
speed resolution of ± 3 knots.
Among the constraints, the environmental
severity factor must be taken into account : electrical
protection, temperature (-30°C/60°C), humidity, sand and dust,
salt spray .... The foreseen MTBF is 5000 hours.
Another essential aspect is that in order to
be efficient, a ground-based equipment needs an automatic
alert transmission.
Ground-based experiments :
The equipment is based on a continuous laser
source (10,6 pm), with a 75 mm telescope focusing between I0
and 100 m. However, in order to increase the range, some
measurements were done at 200 m ([50m, 350m]).
Preliminary tests were settled in CROUZET
facilities in order to observe building-induced turbulence.
Despite CROUZET conclusions, this experiment didn't prove
demonstrative since the collected values didn't show a
sufficient amplitude dynamic (0 to 4 m/s).
The first set of tests consisted of :
-preliminary measurements with a fixed mirror
and focusing distance of 35 m;
-conical scanning : beam steering at 15 °
orientation and 40 rounds per minute for a
focusing distance of 200 m. The theoretical
graph is a sinusoid whose mean value depends
on the wind component along line of sight.
The amplitude is a function of the
perpendicular component module; the phase is
related to its orientation. Wind field
dispersion distorts the ideal curve.
Several rotation speeds were experimented.
Since the angular shifting of line of sight
cannot be omitted any longer during the
acquisition of instantaneous spectra for one
measurement, the spectrum width increases
with the rotation speed.
-measurements in rain conditions : the
spectrum enlarges because of rapidly changing
speeds of turbulence and rain. in some
experiments, rain drops speed signal was more
powerful than wind speed i_self.
The system was then installed on the military
base of Valence. The frequent proximity of helicopters at low
altitude gave the opportunity to collect data on turbulence
engendered by their rotor blades.
-variation of the focusing distance from 30 m
to 200 m showing the spectrum spreading at
"long distance".
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-measurement volume splitting by putting a
mirror on the line of sight in order to
demonstrate the capability of indicating the
change of sign in velocity.
Future studies proposals :
The pulsed technique is the only valid
candidate for the 7,5 Km range criteria. Furthermore, it
guarantees a spatial resolution propotional to the pulse
length and light celerity. Since ground clutter isn't a
sensitive point, a slight deviation of laser beam (2 ° tilt)
could be used to evaluate phenomenon shifting.
An alternate solution,proposed by CROUZET, is
to use two equipments located at 2400 m from each runway
extremity and monitoring a smaller zone : 40 m to 3400 m. This
system would be based on a continuous laser with adaptative
focusing distance. A 30 cm telescope would be used in order to
conciliate cost constraints and atmospheric turbulence
effects. The spatial resolution rapidly deteriorates with
distance. According to CROUZET, a measurement could be
correctly located for distances up to 1 Km and beyond
detection would still be possible for spread and quite
homogeneous phenomena. The idea consists in frequency coding
of emission. This method was tested and validated for
distances lower than 1 Km but it must be experimented for
greater range since it seriouly decreases the signal to noise
ratio. It could also be a mean of getting rid of undesired
targets (insects, birds .... ).
1.3 : Conclusion :
The efficiency of the LIDAR technic is
obviously mostly limited by attenuation due to rain, fog and
by perturbations engendered by moving point clutter (birds,
insects .... ).
Concerning the laser source itself, the
continuous CO= technology is available but pulsed and solid-
state lasers need further development.
In France, airborne LIDAR is also
experimented for vertical wind profiles by the Dynamic
Meteorology Laboratory.
Although CROUZET existing laser anemometry
prototype is well adapted for anemometry purposes, it didn't
appear well suited for a transformation into a wind shear
detector. Furthermore, from preliminary studies, it seems more
efficient to study the option of an airborne LIDAR rather than
a ground-based equipment. That's why, further research work
will be done by the O_[ERA laboratory before proceeding to the
design , integration and validation of an airborne LIDAR in a
flight demonstration program.
2) The second step of
defined but a preliminary study
laboratory (cf i.I).
the LIDAR program is not yet
is to be started with CNERA
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III) SODAR program :
1) Proqram objectives and methodology :
The SODAR system (developped by the REMTECH
company) analyses the backscattered wave resulting, from
emission of sound pulses. The returned signal will be Doppler
shifted in frequency by an amount proportional to the
backscattering cells representative of wind velocity.
The first generation of SODARs included three
horn fed dishes with one vertical antenna and the two other
ones slightly vertically tilted. The whole thing was enclosed
in an absorbant protecting material. This equipment had been
designed to collect wind field direction and intensity in the
low altitude atmosphere layers for pollution detection
purposes mostly.
The aim of the contract between French Civil
Aviation and Remtech Co. was to examine whether it was
feasible to adapt this type of equipment for ground-based wind
shear detection along take-off and landing flight paths.
The evaluation guidelines concerned :
*environmental problems : surrounding noise,
influence of aircraft noise .... ;
*sound pollution generated by the equipment;
*influence of ground proximity at low tilt :
noise, acoustic rays curvature, ground clutter;
*feasability of a "megasodar" supposed to reach
6 Kms by using a multicellular antenna.
The conclusion of this contract notified in may
1987 was supposed to make a comparison between directivity
patterns calculated in simulations and experimental results in
order to check whether it's valid to extrapolate for a
multicellular antenna.
2) Program evolution :
The feeble performances of the horn fed dish
antenna made it impossible to carry out all the necessary
measurements. Consequently, the realization of a multicellular
antenna mock-up became absolutely necessary. That's why, the
priorities previously defined had to be changed. Furthermore,
the bad wheather conditions of spring 1987 in Paris during the
installation on Roissy airport delayed the experimental phase
that is still going on.
The theoretical part consisted in test antenna
optimization (2,4 m dianeter horn fed dish antenna). At a
given frequency, the only paraneter that can be modified is
the illumination function. In order to evaluate the
characteristics in the far-field, directivity calculations
were done by simulations for various amplitude distributions
with phase locked. Obstacle effects were simulated by
approximated calulations.
598
3) Experimental phase :
It was organized in three parts :
*measurement of the antenna characteristics;
*quantification of physical influences;
*wind measurements.
Directivity measurements showed good agreement
between theoretical and effective patterns for angles lower
than 4 ° and an important discrepancy beyond, resulting in high
sensitivity to ground clutter. It was assumed (and
experimentally confirmed afterwards) that this difference was
caused by the obstacle effect generated by the antenna feed
(horn of 25 cm). Directivity measurements using a piezo-
electric tweeter of 8 cm resulted in good agreement with
theory but the improvement for ground clutter is of only 6 dB.
Despite the poor performances of the first
antenna configuration (JBL antenna feed of 25 cm), some
measurements series were recorded with an emission at 4000 Hz
and several tilts were analyzed. It showed the important
influence of temperature and humidity on atmospheric
absorption. These reflectivity fluctuations induce variations
of range from 290 m to 180 m.
Another testing bench with the second antenna
configuration (tweeter + dish antenna) showed that, despite
the ground clutter elimination algorithm, in some cases, wind
measurements were irrelevant. The data processing needed a
manual analysis in order to guarantee good agreement with wind
speeds recorded from an anemometer (from National Meteorology)
located on the airport.
In order to prove "megasodar" feasibility, the
REMTECH company decided to build a small-scale multicellular
antenna mock-up using a rectangular array of tweeters.
The main anticipated advantages are :
*elimination of obstacle effects;
*independant amplitude tuning;
*beam steering by phase shifting among the
different elements;
*increase of power (number of elements).
However, the interaction between elements hasn't
been taken into account and this assumption must be checked by
further experiments.
4) Conclusion :
The small-scale mul ticellular mock-up w_s
designed to reduce complexity by mini:_izing the quantity of
independant elements. Since the major problem concerned th_
vertical plane, the amplitude tuning will only be applied to
the vertical section and there will be less antenna feeds on
the lines than on the columns. Because of their great
dispersion, the tweeters were previously tested and selecte_.
This array is _ade of 392 ele_.ents with a spacing of 8.35 c_:
and distributed into 23 lines and 14 colu2_ns for a surface of
2.5 m x 1.25 m.
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Theoretical calculations of the estimated range
were done. The multicellular mock-up will be taken up soon in
order to be experimented. The success of this stage is crucial
since the lack of performance of previous antenna
configurations made it impossible to demonstrate the ability
of this technic to detect wind shear.
IV) Ground-based RADAR program :
I) Introduction :
Wave-length is a crucial parameter for radar
detection. With wave-lengths S 5 cm, it's possible to design
small antennas with high angular resolution (<<3°), resulting
in good Vertical resolution for wind profiles and a good
protection against ground clutter. However, an experimental
program carried out by the CRPE [4] in 1985 showed that this
type of radar couldn't correctly measure in clear air
condition. It was theoretically concluded that, in order to
operate in clear air as well as in rain conditions, for a
radar of 4.5 Kw peak power equipped with a 5 m antenna, the
optimal bandwith ranged from 20 to 35 cm.
The laboratory designed a 30 cm radar (4.5 Kw
peak power) for atmospheric research purposes (PROUST system).
With a II m antenna, this equipment proved able to vertically
observe the troposphere up to I0 Kms. Of course, the use of a
5 m antenna will decrease the clear air detection level of 7
dB but a compensation from the turbulent energy gain is
anticipated.
consequently, the UHF radar hold the attention as
a feasible candidate in ground wind shear detection.
2) Program objectives :
An agreement was signed with CNET/CRPE [4] in
order to study the feasability of wind shear detection both in
clear air and rain conditions using a ground-based radar.
The aim is to perfect design criteria for a
specialized radar by theoretical and experimental studies with
the following operational ccnszraints :
*radial measurement of _indshear along
departure and arrival flight paths;
*detection in both clear _ir and rain
conditions;
*range : 600 m to i0 Kns;
*range resolution : S 600 m;
*angular resolution : S 3°;
*speed resolution : 5 i0 -z s-1 ;
*false alarm rate : < 10;%
*moderate cost : _ 3 HF (_ 600,000 $) ;
*peak transmission power : K 5 Kw;
*antenna diameter : _ 5 m.
6OO
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3) Program planning:
3.1 Evaluation of 30 cm radars performances at
low horizontal tilt in wind shear conditions :
*Ground clutter calculations,
(July 1988);
*Wind shear models implementation on simulator,
Radar characteristics optimization,
(September 1988);
*Shadow effect generated by aircraft,
Simulation of radar spectra with ground
clutter,
Wind profiles extraction,
(May 1988);
*Experimental evaluation with PROUST radar and
ground clutter and aircraft signatures,
(May 1988);
3.2 Evaluation of feasibility on airport :
*Synthesis of previous tasks,
(November 1988);
*Additional theoretical studies and definition
of an adapted antenna,
(May 1989);
*Measurements of wind shears and/or turbulence
on airport,
(date not fixed);
3.3 Conclusion :
(November 1990);
4) Program evolution :
* Wind shear models (historical, AC!20_41, JAWS
models) were implemented and tested on CNET computer
facilities for simulation. From the discontinuous distribution
of wind speeds, a continuous wind field was produced by using
the techniques described in the JAWS program. Radar spectrum
response within a wind shear field can then be anticipated
gate by gate.
* Ground clutter modelling is based on
gate/ground contact surface and random distribution law of the
obstacles (a hundred obstacles of 107 m _ each for all the
gates).
* Aircraft clutter elimination is the next point
to be studied. Research work concerns :
-antenna optimization (to be studied in 2.2
phase);
-radar processing :
-case of aircraft cn main lobe : saturation,
signal attenunaticn before reception,
elimination algorithm;
-case of aircraft on sideicbe : elimination
algorithm with spectral signature of
aircraft.
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5) Program continuation.:
5.1 Aircraft clutter elimination : (June 1989)
*New algorithms for elimination;
*Simulation and test of previous methods
elimination;
*Statistic study of aircraft clutter;
of
5.2 Ploemeur Bodou experimentation : (June 1989)
*Definition of experiments and schedule;
*Experiments with antenna tilted at 45°;
*Measurements analysis : experimental results
of clutter elimination methods performances.
5.3 Installation on airport : (September 1989)
*Definition of optimal antenna : sidelobes
attenuation (absorbant material, lattice-work, trench),
antenna feed, radiated pattern;
*Definition of the optimal location for
installation : ground clutter minimization for main lobe and
first sidelobes, ground clutter map, possibility of making a
trench, aircraft return reduction by carefully positionning
antenna lobes in relation to taxiways, departure and arrival
flight paths.
6) Preliminary theoretical results :
6.1 Spectral width :
Among the main causes of increasement of
spectrum width such as distribution of scattering cells
speeds, turbulent field mean quadratic speed, limited width of
beam, sampling rate, non ambiguous distance, wind wheat is the
mos,t contributing one, resulting in radar capability in
providing relevant measurements.
6.2 Measurement Accuracy :
Assumption : in the elementary volume chosen
for simulations (30mx30mx30m), the radial speed is supposed to
be constant.
Simulation showed that for low-altitude
horizontal wind shear structures (inversion layer, thermic
wind) localization can be impossible for several gates. For
vertical wind field distributions, the radar delivers a
precise localization of the phenomenon.
Minimum reflectivity factor (Cn z ) required to
guarantee a good detectability at i0 Kns was evaluated as a
function of wind shear intensity per gate. Wind shear
detection at i0 Kms requires an equivalent reflectivity factor
Z. of - I0 dBz for a wind difference (in a gate of 600 m) of 8
m/s (= 16 knots) and of - 2 dBz for 30 m/s (_ 60 knots). These
results do not depend on antenna aperture that can eventually
modify extreme wind speed measured because of the variation of
the volume observed.
6O2
6.3 Safety requirements :
For the pilot :
*Detect wind shear,
*Identify its type,
*Quantify its intensity,
*Localize it,
*Anticipate its evolution;
For the tower officer :
*Wind speed and direction,
*Anticipation on phenomenon duration,
"15 mn prevision of possible occurence.
(as defined by the CLAWS program).
An alert system combining radar detection and
meteorology analysis is presently foreseen in order to
decrease false alarm rate. At the beginning, human
intervention will be necessary but automatization of the whole
process needs to be developped in a further stage. High
collaboration between radar operators and meteorologists is
necessary to develop and fix a performant wind shear alert
algorithm but meteorological research hasn't begun yet.
6.4 Non atmposheric returns :
High power targets may be all the more detected
as the horizontal tilt of the antenna is low.
shear
cross
by the radar
These spurious echoes are a serious danger for wind
detection since the wind tracers have got a smaller
section. This results in two consequences :
*saturation of radar input level,
*superposition of two signatures of hijhly
different power.
Main bibliographical results on efficient
section influence were summarized. Spectral width increasement
due to ground clutter was experimentally evaluated with PROUST
radar (30 cm) . The main results are the following ones :
*phase stability at short term is crucial; it
should be better than 10 -2 Hz (2 10 -3 m/s) ;
*Doppler jitter highly varies with season
(winter/summer), humidity and wind ground;
*In order to quantify spectral increasement due
to ground clutter, the increasement must be defined from the
amplitude corresponding to the noise, that is the width for a
signal to noise ratio taking while into accGunt the return
statistical dispersion;
*The absolute limits variations due to
multipaths, Fourier transform of a temporal limited function,
echoe structure jitter range from DV = 1 m/s to 2 m/s.
Estimations of signal to clutter ratio show
that it is necessary to decrease ground clutter level of 60 dB
in order to guarantee atmospheric detection for the first
gates. Another point is that these <choes create a Doppler
zone of ± 1 m/s where wind shear de_ctien may be difficult. A
method was developped in _rder <o detect atmospheric echoes
with amplitudes and Doppler shifts lower [han those typical of
fixed echoes. This method makes it possible to detect
atmospheric echoes with ground clutter for a signal to noise
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ratio of - 30 dB and Doppler shifts of 0.25 m/s. As long as
the analogic signal doesn't saturate amplification and exceed
analogic/numeric converter capa_lilty, wind shear detection
should be provided.
6.5 Fixed echoes elimination :
Angular and temporal filtering methods of
analogic signal were investigated. The methods that are
presently foreseen for the PROUST radar are :
*"distance gate MTI" (Skolnik,1981) : selection
of the main spectrum line and rejection of the central zone
"polluted" by fixed echoes; this technic needs phase stability
to be efficient;
*adjustement of the ground model to the
spectrum; this method is presently tested on the PROUST radar
and makes it possible to discriminate useful and undesired
echoes.
6.6 Preliminary conclusions :
*ground clutter dynamic : it should be
suppressed by improving antenna efficiency and using numerical
filtering methods.
*very law altitudes detection (<<i00 m) at
short distance from GPIP : a technic consisting of gates of
variable length will soon be simulated for evaluation.
IV) Abbreviations :
[I] Aeronautical Navigation Technical Service (cf Annex I)
Service Technique de la Navigation A4rienne
[2] Aerospatial Studies and Research National Office
Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches A4rospatiales
[3] National Flight Test Center
Centre d'Essais en vol (CEV)
[4] CNET : Telecommunication Research National Center
Centre National d'Etudes des T_l_communications
CNRS : Scientific Research National Center
Centre National de Recherche Scientifique
CRPE : Environmental Physics Research Center, laboratory
jointly sponsored by CNET and CNRS.
Centre de Recherche en Physique de l'Environnement
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cisaillement de vent en prdsencc d'6chos de sol sont fournis en Annexe V. Les principaux
rdsultats de cette simulation en ce qui conceme les 6chos de sol sont r6sum6s dans les figures
•(2,7) et (2,8) ci apr_s.
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Figure (2,7): variation du rapport puissance chafer puissance bruit
parfiltre dquivalent FFT, en fonction de la distance (pones I d 15 );
pour deux valeurs de l'angle de visde (or = 3deg et o_= 10 deg );
et pour deux valeurs diffdrentes du niveau des lobes secondaires de"
l"antenne :
20 clB en traits plehzs
30 dB el tiretds
L'ouverture de l'antenne est ici de 0 = 4 deg
-w
Dans cette simulation, on a fait varier l'ouverture de l'antenne (®) ; l'angle de vis6e
(c£) ; et le niveau des lobes secondaires. Le tableau ci-dessous donne l'ensemble des
variations utilis6es •
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L'analyse de cette simulation appelle plusieurs remarques.
1°) Le rapport Puissance de l'6cho/Puissance du Bruit (Pc/PB) varie en fonction de la
distance pour chaque ouverture d'antenne et angle de vis6e. Les figures (2.7) et (2.8)
r6sument les variations obtenues dans cliaque porte radar (15 pones de 600m) en fonction de
l'angle de vis6e pour des niveaux de lobes secondaires de -20 et -30 dB et pour deux valeurs
d'ouverture d'antenne : ® = 4 ° (fig. 2.7) et O = 3° (fig. 2.8).
Pour ® = 4 ° le rapport Pc/PB est peu sensible (dans les premieres portes) aux
variations de l'angle de vis6e et au niveau des lobes secondaires. I1 reste _ un niveau de
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Figure (2,9) • Spectres bruts obtenus d Saint Santin par le radar
PROUST visant d la verticale (rapport SignallBruit en fonction de
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4 d 10 (4500m _ 8100m d'altitude). La situation m&dorologique est
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632
22/06/8BII Oil 52_1 395
AL'rl S/B (dB)
81o _-IO _ _
57oC
510C
450C
.4 -3 .2 .! o I
vENT tin/s)
2 3
Figure (2,10) • Spectres aonosph_riques "air clair" obtenus apr_s
_limination des _chos de sol par la mdthode d'ajustement d_crite dans
le § 1.2.1.6.2.2".
633
oI.-
_D
0
0
E
0
0
kO
' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' '
ttffttttttttl_tt_t_l_tt_t_
fttttttl_tttttttttttttttt
fttttttttttttttttttttttt
fttttttttttttttttttttt_t
tttttttttttttttttttttttt
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
_- I'0 e,,I _-
634
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
cO
_o E
0
(/1
oE
0 0
0 ,-
0
0
0
c',,I
0
0
I00 '
I00
c
o
100
100
%o
t
2O
I
,I
2O
2O
2O
2O
2O
20
2O
0
0
0
0
0
I
-20
| , •
I
-20
.20
-20
-20
-20
-20
-2O
zmln(m) == 245.0
i porte 14zmox(m)= 715.0
zmin( .m)== 229.0
porte 13
zmox(rn),= 668.0
zmin(m)= 2 14.0
porte 12
Zmox(m)== 621.0
zmin(rn)== 198.0
porte 1 !
ZrnOX(rn)= 574.0
Zmin(m)= 182.0
porte I 0
Zrnox(m)= 527.0
zrnin(rn)= 166.0
porte 9
zmox(m)= 480.0
zmin(m)= 151.0
porte 8
Zrnax(m)= 433.0 "
zmin(m) = 135.0
altitude du radar(m)
puissance crete(W)
Iorg-impulsion(micro-s) =
Iongueur d'onde(cm)
angle de visee(deg)
ouverture-ont enne(deg)
gainde I'antenne(dB)
niveau-lobes-second.(d8) .
10.0
'$500.
4.00
" 30.00
" 87.00
" 1.50
'= 4.1.7
20.0
100
50
0
100
5O
0
100
50
0
-. 100
100
C
o
in
100
50
0
I00
50
0
5O
0
20
2O
2o
2O
2O
2O
2O
2O
0
0
0
0
0
O.
vent(m/s)
-20.
635
porte 7
zmox(rn)= 386.0
Zrnin(m)= 119.0
porte 6
zrnox(rn)= 339.0
Zrnln(rn) == 104.0
porte 5
zmox(rn)- 292.0
zmin(m)= 88.0
porte 4
ZrnOx(rn)= 245.0
zmin(rn)= 72.0
porte 3
zrnox(rn)= 198.0
zmln(rn)= 57.0
porte .2
Zmox(m)== I51.0
Zrnin(rn)= 41.0
porte l
ZrnOX(rn)= I04.0
zmin(rn)= 25.0
porte 0
ZrnOx(m)= 57.0
zmin(m)= 10.0
modele 14
atterrissoge
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
On
0
$.,.
o
(3o
lib
"13
0
E
0
0
uO
::I:::::::::::::P TTT T
0 0 0 O" 0
0 0 0 0
rO ('q ,--
636
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O0
0
o .
E
0
oE
0 0
0 ,--
0
0
0
OJ
0
I.-_l
Z
02O 0 -20
100
5O
0
20 0 -2O
100 - ' ....
O
20 0 -20
.-. 100 " ' ' , ,
q3
= 20 0 -20 "
,oo
so
• 0
• I/I
100
• 30. 50
O
1O0
50
0
IO0
5O
0
2O
2O
20
2O 0 -20
venl:(m/'s)
zrnin(rn)= 166.0
porte t 4
Zrnox(rn)= 794.0 oltitude du rodar(m) = 10.0
zrnin(rn)= 156.0 puissonce crete(W) = 4500.
porte 13 l°rg-impulsi°n(rnicr°'s) = 4.00
zrnax(rn)=, 7.41.0
• Iongueur d'o'nde(crn) = 30.00Zrnin(rn)= 146.0 " "
porte 12" ongle de visee(deg) == 87.00
zrnox(rn)= 689.0 °uverture-ontenne(deg ) =. 2.00
Zrnin(m)= 135.0 goin de I'ontenne(dS) "= 39.2
porte II niveou-lobes-second.(clB) .= 20.0
zrnox(rn)= 637.0
'zrnln(rn)= 125.0
porte 10
Zrnox(rn)= 585.0
zmin(rn)= 114.0
porte 9
zrnox(m)= 532.0
zrnirl(rn)-- 104.0
porte 8
Zrnox(m)= 480.0
zrnin(rn_= 93.0
1O0
50
• O
100
50
O
IO0
50
0
2O
2O
2O
porte 7
zrnox(rn)= 428.0
zmin(rn)= 83.0
porle 6
zrnox(m)= 375.0
Zrnin(rn) = 72.0
porte 5
zmax(m)= 323.0
zrnnin(rn) = 62.0
porte 4
zrnox(rn)= 271.0
Zrnin(m)= 5I.O
porte t 3
zmox(m)= 219.0 ,
•Zrnin(rn)= 4 l.O
porte 2
ZrnOx (m}== 166.0
zrnirt(rn) = 30.020 0 -20
100 - ' ....
50 _ porte !O, ZrnOx(rn)= I14.0
20 0 -20 zrnin(rn)= 20.0
100 " ' ' , ,
50 _ porte OO Zrnox(m)= 62.0
20 O -20 zmin(rn)= tO.O
vent(rn/,s/
637
rnodele 8
otterrissoge
;7"; ' , ,, •
Questions and Answers for 19 October Sessions I and II
639
P;_:.CL_-',_ BLAT_,_ BlOT FILMED
19 October ._988 Ouestio_ _'nd Answer Session _'" '_'
(tape started in the middle of a sentence) with our three dimensional model, we are
producing complex wind fields from different microburst events and 2) as the
computers are growing _ more powerful, for example, a new computer, a Cray II will
be delivered very soon at NASA. We will be able to run some very high resolution
lines with those three dimensional models and as far as .. I mean, I say I wouldn't
say that anybody working on these problems shouldn't use just model data by
themselves, certainly they should try some of the observational data, but there's certain
advantages with the model data in that we can provide very high resolution data of
the wind fields and also we can provide other things like temperature, humidity, rain,
snow, etc. Does that help?
For example, I mean the model cases that you sound so far are simulating microburst
outflows. One possible source of nuisance alarms to this systems are strong
divergences or velocity grading as seen on the backside of gust fronts and if those gust
fronts aren't generated by the simulator, are you ever going to capture the nuisance
alarms generated by those kinds of phenomena that will be perceived by the system?
A: Well I think looking at a gust front, for example, if you run it through the F factor
calculation and it exceeds, it either goes in a negative direction, which is not
hazardous, or it doesn't last long enough, then it would be filtered out. I would like
Roland to comment on gust front problems and we're trying to look at the microburst
problems as the most severe and answer a question back, earlier you talked about
using some real ground based data and we would like to do that if we can get the
data that has this chaotic information in it, raw data, with resolutions in the order of
50 to 100 meters and I don't think that's available to get from anywhere so we've got
to do it through simulation process.
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Well, I guess there are different kinds of issues you can address and I'd argue that in
terms of understanding how well your system can do in dealing with some of the sort
of the natural interference and noisiness in the sensing process and meteorological
processes, perhaps you don't need to capture it at the resolution that your using in
your modelling, in fact, you can get a pretty good bound on what the magnitude of the
problem is by looking at a coarser resolution. I think as far as the gust front or other
kinds of shear signatures, you have to face the problem that either .. you can take the
time to detect shears that are hazardous, whether they are from microburst or other
kind of phenomena, but you're still trapped in the situation of either saying, if you
want to detect all the kinds of hazardous shears, then you better simulate them and
assess your performance against the whole spectrum. If you're only interested in
detecting microburst shears, then you still have to look at those other kinds of
phenomena to see that you reject them and so I think it's difficult to assess the true
performance and detectability or false alarmity of your system without considering a
real spectrum of phenomena and what the system is going to do on that entire
combination and I'm not sure you're getting there by simulating specific phenomena
in the absence of all the other kinds of contamination that you're really going to see.
Doing it against flight test data, it's great. But the thing you're going to have to face
up with then is what are you going to use as far as the ground truth data base is
concerned. It's a great approach but there is a serious problem of understanding what
was really out there when you collect the data.
Any other comments on that question.
Did we get everybody's questions, I think I've got them all here. Norm had a
question, Q: Do you have plans to use your radar model microburst model to study
TDWR placement strategies? If not, why not? A: Well, the answer to that is no,
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we're not going to do that, it's not in our charter, we're looking at the airborne.
Certainly the simulation program could be made available and if FAA wants to
sponsor or somebody sponsor that activity that possibility of the radar simulation model
could be useful, but it's not something we're going to be doing.
Herb, would you can to comment on that? At this point, I don't know of any plans
for using the model in TDWR, Wayne or Jim could talk to it, but for one thing, it's
a smaller domain size than what you're looking at, if I'm not mistaken for a placement
strategy but anyway if you could get a microphone to Jim Evans who will make the
proper response.
Well, we've been involved of course in this, there are a bunch of sites already being
chosen. I think we take the contrarian view, I guess the answer we would say is over
the last four years, we've probably measured close to 1500 microbursts and we believe
that as far as understanding to the knowledge that we think, in terms of radar sensing
we have a fairly good idea of what altitudes we want to look at and we're not
convinced that we're going to learn anything at this point that would improve on the
database from running a simulation. The other side of it is in terms of the ground
clutter and it's predictability, I think the grazing angles we're talking about are very
close to 0 degrees and there's a very large database of ground based measurements
at those kinds of grazing angles and practical experience so again, we don't see that
as being a practical factor. Thanks Jim.
Jim, I was trying to address the other problem of if you put the radar at the end of
the runway, looking up the glad slope, you put it X miles away so you can surveil a
bigger terminal area i....
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The strategy that the FAA is utilizing which is a proper topic I guess for tomorrow is
been to sight off the airport and in fact work at achieving the kind of timely warning
that we heard a plea from a few minutes ago which was by being able to look a loft,
you would be able to see things coming down and in fact issue warnings well in
advance and in the ease of TDWR the users, the requirement we're working at is to
provide a one minute warning to pilots before they encounter a hazardous wind shear
condition and if you think that's by and large been held up in the major of
experiments today and we'll have a chance to hear about that tomorrow.
Let me go down the list of speakers, Ernie.
This is Ernie Baxa and I have several questions. I will make an attempt to respond
to what I can and then I'm going to refer to Brae and Les Britt, because I think some
of them are model questions.
This first one is from Jim Bull, Q: Azimuth side low clutter can appear at all
velocities of interest, have you computed the clutter to signal ratio for side low clutter
from azimuth side lows for practical antennas say a 28 inch antenna at x-band. A:
The figure that I had shown was a figure to indicate some qualitative aspects of
clutter, to answer the question I guess, succinctly yes, side low clutters included in
model and I think Brae could probably elaborate on it just a little bit.
Yes, we have done some analysis looking at a 30 inch antenna and this information
was shown in an earlier paper this morning but it does indicate the side low levels.
This one is spectrum at a particular range bend, I think it was 4 1/2 kilometers from
the aircraft. The aircraft was at 5 kilometers from touchdown and the main clutter
with a 0 degree tilt was right, this is the main beam clutter right here, it is real spiked
though here with some side lobe energy falling off, now actually there's energy much
lower down if we could extend this scale down, you'd see energy going further and
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further out but the energy is so low that really beyond when it gets down to this
relative to the peak, it doesn't contribute a lot. When you tilt the antenna up by 2
degrees you can see that the main beam goes from way up at some 50 db here goes
way down to about 5 db but the side lobe energy gets shifted a little bit in frequency
but doesn't, is not changed a lot. Over on this other plot over here, we're pointed off
at an azimuth of 10 degrees, and again, this is the main beam energy coming right
through at this point, when you tilt it down, the side lobe energy, it doesn't change
much but we have looked at the side lobe energy and the clutter to signal ratio and
it does get included in the simulation program.
Jim, do you want to make a comment?
This is Ernie Baxa again, I have a question from Howard Long at Delta Airlines. Q:
How do you expect to automate wind shear detection so that little or no operator time
is required? A: I can't really answer that question directly. What I wanted to say
though is from a signal processing point of view, what our main concern is to provide
what I would call a statistically efficient as well as a computationally efficient statistic
that is also a sufficient from a standpoint of wind shear detection and/or wind shear
prediction and how that is used is really to be communicated to a pilot or to someone
who is going to have to take action is really a different matter from my perspective.
Would you like to comment further on your question or concern. I think that's a
question a lot of folks are certainly interested in and there have been other papers
that have discussed that.
This is Herb Schlickenmaier, FAA, it gets back a bit back to what Dave Carbaugh was
talking about on how one integrates the human factors questions into the systems
design and that's paramount, absolutely. It's not these guys jobs.
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I certainly don't want to give the impression that I think it's a minimum problem or
a non-problem. A couple of questions from Jim Evans, I will make some comments
but I think Brac and maybe Los might want to comment too. Some of this has
already been talked about in responding to earlier questions. Q: Why doesn't the
clutter spectra show frequency components over the full unambiguous philosophy
range? Clutter velocity is 0 meters per second for clutter well in the front of the
aircraft, 60 meters per second below aircraft and 120 meters per second well behind
the aircraft. This would after .. this should be aliasing I believe, extend over the entire
frequency band. A: I think we've addressed that in answering Jim Bull's question.
Yes it is distributed. Do we need to elaborate on it? It is all relative to aircraft
velocity that was the basically the ground speed, that was the 0 on the Doppler
spectrum.
Next question is also from Jim Evans. Q: Have you considered the loss in sensitivity
due to attenuation of the weather signal by the notch filters in your simulations. This
would be particularly significant with a one pole canceller if you are to achieve 25 db
clutter suppression. A: Yes, the model the analysis that goes with the model that Dr.
Britt, Les Britt from RTI have been working with, does in fact compute the
attenuation of the weather signal. It's not at the present time included in the model
that I have been working with at evaluating filters but it will be and is certainly a
significant matter. The issue here has to do with evaluating how clutter filters affect
the quality of the signal, the information content of the signal or the power level really
of the signal itself. That is an important consideration. What we have clone so far
had to do with estimating the mean and the widths of the spectrum, rather than the
power levels on the sensitivity issue. Does that satisfy that?
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The last question from Jim Evans, Q: Are the effects of transmitter receiver
instabilities being addressed in your analysis? What is the level of these in current
systems and what is postulated for proposed systems?
A: There's a comment with this magnitron transmitter receivers generates substantive
signal energy frequencies which would be in the past band of the clutter filters you
have described. I want to make one comment and I want to ask Les Britt to make
a comment about what's in the model. Presently I have a student looking at the
effects at phase jitter on the pulse pair instrumentation procedure but basically going
back and accounting for phase jitter looking at a phase jitter spectrum and one of our
thrusts in this analysis was to create a set of specifications that would be appropriate
for a radar system. That work has begun but is not anywhere near completion ..
there's nothing I can really report at the present time except it is a messy problem.
Les might want to say what's in the model at present.
In calculating the I and Q signals, this is the way they're calculated and this does have
a term in that to represent phase error, which is a random phase term that is
generated statistically in the model and changes for every pulse so that's in there.
Now, the number that we've been putting in is a half of .. corresponds to a velocity
or a mass of a half meter per second. This is the number we got from Varian
Associates, talking about some of the stabilities of their transmitters. This is an input
and one of the things that we're trying to determine the effects of, I mean, we're not
building operational hardware, we're doing tradeoff studies that would hopefully come
up with a spec, in other words, we'll determine the effects of phase jitter and then say
the effect of it if it gets bad, so we're kind of working the problem the other way
around. This is a parameter in the simulation. No, well I'll say it again, we're not
building an operational system so the simulation is just a .. it simulates the transmitter
with a certain phase jitter, you know it doesn't matter whether it's a magnitron,
clyston, a solid state or what have you.
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This is Bracalente. In our flight hardware that we're procuring for the experiment, we
will not be using the magnitron because of this problem. Probably be using a TWT
or a solid state for the low power version and TWT to get up to a couple KW which
has much more stable frequency and phase characteristic.
Did that answer that question?
I would just make one comment, I think you'll find that they make amplitude errors
as well and what wasn't clear and maybe you could put up on the board was whether
this phase error is applied to the clutter signals. Is this formula the formula that's
used to compute the clutter signal. A: Yes, this is as I said in the description of the
simulation, the signal that comes from a particular range bend is a sum of population
of random scatters and the phase term contains a term for transmitter phase error,
a random variable which represents the phase jitter of the transmitter from pulse to
pulse. (new speaker) Ok, so this formula is used for both weather scatters and ground
clutter scatters. A: Yes, that's right.
Carrol Lytle, NASA LaRC. I have a question from Jim Evans, MIT Lincoln Lab. Q:
Have you considered moving your roof top system to a location that is TDWR test
bed measurement site which have frequent microburst activity and the requisite support
sensors to obtain realistic microburst outflow back scatter data. A: As a short answer,
yes we have considered it. Obviously the instrumentation we're talking about is the
aircraft instrumentation and the first priority is to use this on the aircraft. Now we
will be using it on the roof when we're not scheduled on the aircraft. We have
considered what would be involved in taking this to someplace like Denver but we
have made no commitment to engage in a program of that nature. The logistics of
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sending someone out on site for an extended period. It's something we would fike to
do but we're not committed to it.
Pat, did you have any questions. Is Brian Gallagher, you've got a couple as well.
Dave Watt from the University of New Hampshire said that he will honest send us
back all the written answers, he had to leave early and I would imagine Russ Targ will
do the same.
The first question was from Jim Evans. Q: How does an infrared sensing system
distinguish the cool air outflow of a gust front and that of a microburst. A: Right
now, it doesn't. What we're doing is looking at the data that we can get and trying
to see what we can do about it and when we actually get in the air, we'll be able to
get a little better handle on that.
Second question is also from Jim Evans. This wasn't in the presentation today but a
lot of the work that I'm doing and others in the infrared is doing is based on Pete
Quenes work in the jaws. Q: The penetration of strong microburst outflows between
300 and 800 feet AGL is quite risky and has not been achieved on many microburst
events. That is less than three at the most during the TDWR tests. Have the claim
42 low altitude microburst penetration during jaws been independently, that is by
NCAR scientist confirmed? A: I don't know, I did go back and pull out the report.
The data was taken on the 14 - 15 of July in the B57B. The systems that were up
on that day was the busiest day in the entire jaws project where the 3 radars, the
BS7B, the King Air and so on, those come from the jaws final report. The jaws data
shows 8 microbursts on the 14 and 21 on the 15. Out of the report from Quene and
that's the NASA final report number which I did verify with Kerkowski who was in
charge of that project with NASA Ames. He said there were approaches and
encounters into shear conditions at Stapleton and vicinities in the jaws network and
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the encounterswere in the lower 100 meters so the answer to your question Jim, I
don't really know. I did when I just got into this go to the NCAR people and others
to try to substantiate where these microbursts were against the fly track and I had
no luck in doing that. The project as I understand it was that the radars would
indicate an area where the B57 should go to look for shears and that's exactly what
they did. So, I guess the question is you need to talk to Quene, but I think the
answer is that the correlation between the air craft track and the radars was not done
on purpose. In other words, they weren't tracking the aircraft with the radar at the
same time all this was going on. It was a very busy day and I couldn't get any
correlation between the work that was clone on the radars and the aircraft. Does that
answer your question.
We tried flying planes in and around the Denver where there's microburst going on
and I would be quite astonished that one would be that successful at flying along 100
meters above the ground through strong microburst and not getting into all kinds of
problems with Air Traffic Control and everybody else in the system and as far as not
knowing whether the airplane went near the radar, it's a little surprising that if this is
a prime data source, I means NCAR people know very well where the microbursts
were in location and as in L, as a function as time and I would presume that the
aircraft people knew very well where it was as a function of time, that's why I'm a
little astonished that nobody knows where the plane was relative to the microburst.
I can tell you, two things I know for use. I talked to Glen Stinet, who was the test
pilot of that plane and asked him if he encountered a lot of microburst. He said he
spend the entire day encountering microburst, going into them. You'll have to .. I
can't answer the question past that and maybe Wayne could help verify it if
somebody's willing to take the time and look at the aircraft track. The big problem
was though was that the aircraft wasn't necessarily in the area where the radars were.
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It was in and out of the area and was being vectored towards significant areas. That's
the best I can tell you.
I guess I'm really prepared to answer the question in great detail on where the
airplane was relative to the microburst for the B57, but I know in the case of the King
Air, we flew through a great number of microbursts that summer but nothing at 100
meters AGL, I will confirm that because I did virtually all of those and so from King
Air data I'd be surprised if there were any at that altitude, although there were quite
a few at somewhat higher altitudes. The B57, I think had some lower altitude
penetrations but I don't know the number but I'm sure that those data are available,
I know Pat came looking for it and B57 data exists and I'm sure those people knew
where they were. As did the jaws radar people know where the microbursts were so
it's reconstructible data.
Yes, I guess the other point Jim is that that instrument was completely equipped with
data recorders and the shears are very verifiable just from the aircraft data so you
know I think it's a matter .. I took the information I could get and used it.
The other question was from Jim Bull at Boeing. Q: How much rain can your
sensors see through? Isn't there likely to be rain before a microburst in some cases?
A: Thanks to the folks at MIT, I asked them to give us an enroute approach set of
numbers for how wet the microbursts were in both the Huntsville and Denver work
and to make a long story short, it's was about 30 dbz on average for the wet areas
and a little less then that in Denver. But also to show off what the low-tram would
indicate for rain, there's a simple empirical equation for the transmission as a function
of distance in rain and with one inch of rain you can look about 2 1/2 kilometers and
3 inches of rain about 1.18 kilometers. I also took out some of the data we calculated
with the NASA provided models and what I've got here is the temperature profile as
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sensed by an infrared sensor, ours at two different wavelengths. The temperature
front he model is being sensed by the two different wavelengths. The 15 microns
which is our near channel essentially rides right on top of the temperature in the
model and 13.4 shows the advanced measurement of temperature and starts to go to
very short distance or effective look path right about 3 inches per hour in the model.
So the answer to your question, you could see at least a kilometer at 3 inches per
hour and 2 inches per hour is read on the radar scope so does that answer your
question. Thank you.
Mark Storm did you have any questions. Mark Storm will answer his questions if has
any. Fair enough. Kioumars did you have a question? Dave had a question? Terry
or Renee did you have any questions?
This is Dave Hinton, NASA LaRC, question for Mark. Q: Isn't there a big difference
between following a stick shaker with a training aide versus not reaching stick shaker
when flying the flight path angle? A: I'm not sure exactly what that means. I think
that if you have two guidance strategies that exit the shear at the same altitude one
flys 10 seconds of stick shaker and another one a void stick shaker there is a big
difference. If that what you're .. operationally there is. The only qualification you
have on that is that if the other strategy, the one that does not fly your stick shaker
involves something that is counter intuitive to the crew, we have to face that training
issue for it to be successful. Second question from Joey Sepi Q: With respect to
conclusion No. 1 predicted benefits advanced recovery procedures may not be achieved
or manually flown, how do you generalize your conclusion based on when recovery
procedures to other advanced guidance procedures. Our efforts have shown that your
conclusions are incorrect for at least one other guidance procedure. A: With respect
to that, I underline the words may not, I don't say you that can not realize it, I'm
saying that going from bad simulation to pilot simulations there are many factors that
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must be taken into account or you may not achieve the benefits, that's what I was
seeing in my results. One of my strategies of flight path angle strategy develops
trajectories that look nearly identical to the trajectory shown in the slide on PC
programs that Barrios did, where it will go to a target altitude level off fly path. Same
type of results. When I flew that in the take off case recovery procedures across all
the shears that I threw at it, it was statistically the same as the other procedures.
There was one shear however, the strongest magnitude shear where that procedure
was statistically better than any of the others. It was very, very tiny, so it depends
on what you throw at it.
From Jim Evans at Lincoln Lab. Q: A very important element in your forward look
reactor alert comparison is the assumed vertical profile in horizontal wind. The
assumed outflow profile is very shallow compared to the assumptions made in the
NASA Airborne Doppler Radar program where in they typically measure horizontal
wind at 400 to 500 meters above the ground, which profiles view is appropriate? A:
I think we answered it as a misconception of the 400 to 500 meter altitude that we've
answered but I would like to mention that the analytic wind shear model I was using
was not pulled out of a hat, that is it was fitted to an output from Fred Proctor's task
program that was based on a sounding in Denver, 30 June 1982 and from that
sounding he generated a series of microbursts with different rain shaft diameters and
this was one of the smaller scale microburst that resulted from that sounding. Q:
How would you result on benefits on forward look sensing have changed if you had
assumed a much thicker outflow depth, that is with the winds down 50% from the
peak level at 500 meters above ground level? A: I can't say for certain without
actually doing it but my belief is not a whole lot for two reasons. One is that my
energy hide analysis which I'm getting more confidence in as I test, the F factor was
assumed constant across the shear regardless of altitude so there was no fall off of
winds in altitude in that case. Secondly, I would expect that the Deltas, that is the
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difference in performance with or without forward look would be slightly smaller for
sure with stronger altitude but the trends would be the same, very nearly the same.
Howard Long has a question. Q: Do you feel that a forward looking system with
guidance that provides a 5 to 10 second warning could provide equivalent safety to a
reactive system with guidance? A: Good question, I'd like to give a qualified yes to
that. The reason I ought to qualify it is that the exact numbers cannot be determined
at this point. I have not tested in pilot simulations a 5 second warning so I can't say
what would happen there. The second reason is that we would have to test that with
a variety of shears and aircraft types to find out what those minimum numbers would
be and a third very important thing to consider is that in my studies, the pilots know
they're going to hit a wind shear and they react immediately upon an alert. When I
give them a 10 seconds warning, there are times when they receive that warning and
tell me in light of operation, I may not go around just yet because I haven't seen
anything on my .. I have no reason to go around yet, I might think that was a false
alarm. So whether or not they would go around with 5 to 10 seconds warning is really
going to depend on crew training, displays if they can actually see what's in front of
them, etc, so if they actually started to go around with 10 seconds warning, yes, you
can achieve a quick level of safety.
Rob or Alex. Evidently they will answer their questions later in writing as well. Dave,
you said you had a couple of questions. One question.
My one question, I mean I assume that's a misspelling on the Lockheed Alert, it
should be a Look Ahead Alert, less than 11 seconds advanced warning to react a
detection of caution positive energy enunciation or a warning negative energy in
essence and the reactive alert was based on negative energy. That's it.
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The point I was trying to make as part of the question was that if you did have a
cautionary alert system based on the positive energy, that you could improve 11 second
negative factor by some amount. Yes, but we didn't use a cautionary so I really can't
give you that answer because I don't know. Anybody else?
And can you believe to finish this set up there's a guy by the name of Herb
Sehlickenmaier, is he any where in the building? From Norm Crayble, Q: Is the
FAA's mieroburst policy that the pilot be provided with enough information to permit
him to successfully fly through any microburst within it's capability and thus maintain
airport acceptance rate or to avoid any mierobursts which may pose an unreasonable
threat to safety? A: the policy is avoidance. How one avoids a microburst is the
purpose of the work that Jim Evans is doing and that Wayne is doing and the NASA
team and I are doing which is to provide sufficient information for the flight crew and
for air traffic to make reasonable estimates of the hazard and thus provide avoidance
to the crew in a dynamic environment like a mieroburst that doesn't always happen
as a discreet event, the mountain that isn't going to move in the next time an airplane
comes by so it's not a binary event and the process of information that we're giving
is continuous. Thank you very much folks on the agenda.
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F:gure 3. Illustrationof the LLWAS at Denver StapletonInternationalAirport, showing a
generalized array of wind sensors spaced ground airport. Note that spacing is wider than
typical microburst, resulting in many microbursts slipping through the "net." The system
was originally designed to detect gust fronts rather than microbursts. (a) Shows the spacing
prior to 1985, while (b) shows the spacing as enhanced to better detect microbursts. This
improved spacing (b) is available at both Denver Stapleton International Airport and New
Orleans International Airport. (Source: FAA, 1987a)
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\TDWR Bri_ng Paper
Type of
wind shear
Runway _reshoid
win_
Wino shear
HeadwJnd Location
change (kts)
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
MBA
CF
35 LD
35 RD
35 LA
35 RA
17 LA
17 RA
17 LD
17 RD
190
160
180
030
180
180
160
180
030
16
22
5
23
10
$
22
10
23"
G25
50- RWY
25- RWY
55- 1 MF
60- 3 MF
25- RWY
$5- RWY
60- RWY
$5- RWY
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TDWR P RO DU CTS
1988 OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATION
MICROBURST DETECTION*
- LOCATION
- INTENSITY
GUST FRONT DETECTION*
- LOCATION
- INTENSITY
- DIRECTION AND SPEED OF MOVEMENT
WIND SHIFT PREDICTION
- 20 MINUTE AIRPORT ARRIVAL WARNING
- WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED BEHIND GUST
FRONT
• PRECIPITATION
- STANDARD 6 NWS LEVELS
- HIGH RESOLUTION, LOW ALTITUDE PRODUCT
NEAR AIRPORT
- LOWER RESOLUTION, MEDIUM ALTITUDE
PRODUCT NEAR GATES
* These products will generate microburst and wind shear warnin:
that will be provided to pilots.
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RECOMMENDATION REGARDING POSSIBLE FLIGHT
OPERATIONS DECISION-MAKING AS A RESULT OF
MICROBURST ALERTS DURING THE TDWR OPERATIONAL
DEMONSTRATION
AVOID KNOWN WIND SHEAR-Guidance from the Windshear
Training AM. Consider the following:
• TDWR Operational Demonstration is expected to clearly
identify microburst wind shear events at Stapleton, with a
high probability of detection and a low false alarm rate.
• When TDWR identifies a microburst, there is a high
probability that a severe wind shear is present.
• The Windshear Training Aid Guideline for recognition of a
high probability of severe wind shear is:
THIS OBSERVATION REQUIRES CRITICAL
ATTENTION. DECISION TO AVOID IS
APPROPRIATE.
• Consider the development of a decision- making bulletin for
Summer 1988 for Denver flight operations.
706
EXCERPT
B-727 FLIGHT MANUAL- HANDBOOK
BULLETIN #
JUN XX, 1988
FROM: DENTK- FLIGHT STANDARDS AND
TRAINING
UA POLICY
During the conduct of this test, as is currently the
case, a "Wind Shear" alert must be given serious
consideration by the flight crew. All pertinent factors
relating to a planned takeoff or approach must be
critically examined before the specific course of action,
e.g., normal procedures, precautions, or avoidance
action is decided upon. (See Flight Handbook
Additional Procedures, Windshear Section)
A "Microburst" alert, however, clearly indicates that
avoidance action is required. A FLIGHT MUST
NOT DEPART NOR CONDUCT AN APPROACH
THROUGH AN AREA WHERE A MICROBURST
ALERT IS IN EFFECT. Delay the takeoff or approach
until the condition no longer exists along your intended
flight path.
707 "
A VARIETY OF R_%NDOM THOUGHTS BY JOHN MCCAIKTI-I%
ON THE OCCASION OF THE REVIEW OF THE MICROBURS _.
INCIDENT OF JULY Ii, 1988
Som_ sDec_c comments on the July llth case:
The microburst algorithm did an excellent job in detecting
the onset of the microburst, and apparently pro_-lded an alert
sequence that accurately po_rays the developing intensity, of
the event. Essentially, the system worked at least as we]/as
we could have expected.
Controllerspro_-idedthe fiveflightcrews with the message as
intended. It isunclear that the message impact issui_ciently
c!ear,and a significanteffortisnecessary to address message
knpact, etc.
There was a sigxfificantvariationin flightcrew awareness of
the program, in spite of substantialU AL effortto do so.
It would appear that wind shear recovery procedures were
important aspects of a successfuloutcome.
Flight crews did not provide wind shear PIKEPS, even though
severe encounters occurred.
Human factor, information transfer, and training are the
issues that dominate the action items.
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OF ?OOR QUALITY
Aircraft Performance in Wind Shear
• Ground based systems currently provide velocity
differentlal (DV)in microbursts.
• We are examining the feasibility of measuring shear
(DV/DR) as a hazard redefinition.
• Critical Question: Should hazard definition from
a ground-based system be a binary (GO/NO GO)
threshold?
STRATEGIC VS TACTICAL DECISION
• Does a shear calculation invite flight crews to
"THREAD THE NEEDLE?"
• Objective: To provide sufficient accuracy of wind
shear hazard to provide "quality" go/no go decision.
• Should ATC be allowed to deny clearance to land or
clearance to take off, once high quality hazard infor-
mation is provided?
717
Information Transfer:
Human Factor Issues in Wind Shear Hazard Alerts
Assist FAA (Air Traffic Control-Aviation Standards)
in sorting inlormation transfer issues in hazard alert
message delivery.
• Controller procedures
• Flight crew awareness
, terminolog_j
, training issues
718
Airborne Wind Shear in situ Alerting
Validation with wind shear data collected by penetration
aircraft, in conjunction with multiple Doppler weather
radar analysis.
To what extent are the current generation of in situ
sensor systems adequately validated?
MOTTO OF TERMINAL DOPPLER
WEATHER PROGRAM
VALIDATION
VALIDATION
VALIDATION
Does this model apply to airborne alert system ?
If not, why not ?
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Session I. Ground Systems
A Cursory Study of F-Factor Applied to Doppler Radar
Kimberly L. Elmore and Wayne R. Sand, NCAR
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A Cursory Study of F-Factor Applied to Doppler Radar
Kimberly L. Ellzzore, Wayne R. Sand
National Center for Atmospheric Research
P.O. Box 3000, Boulder, CO 80307
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A Hazard Index: F-Factor
F
,-4
9 TAS'
_?x = wind component Mong flight path,
9 = acceleration due to gravity,
_3 = vertical wind,
TAS = true airspeed.
From Bowles and Targ, 1988
725
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A Model
y = Asin _--_x ,
nr
D-
2
To filld the maxinunn difference between shear estimates l_ased
on AV/Ar and those based on the model, evaluate Oy/Ox at
AV_
Oy/Oxl_=° - Ar 2 cos(0)
AV_
Ar 2
x=O:
This is the nlaxinmm ratio between the two estimates.
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The Least-Squares Fit
The least squares residual is given by:
i/2
R(fl): .f [ftx-Asin(2-_x)]
--1/2
2
fl : slope of least squares line
Least squares line given by y =/3x + o.
Mininfize tile residuM:
112
_'(o1 = 21J.i
-1/_.
--0.
1/2
x2dx-2A .f ,sin(2-_x) dx
--1//2
Solve for fl:
fl/2 7f
A.]_i/2 x sili (-2-'_:r) (l:c
x2 dx
727
Evaluate the numerator using integration by parts with u = x,
dv=sin _--_x ,du=l andv- 7r cos _--_x .
- _ -xcos (2-D -_/2
-1/2
+ sin _-_ z -x/2
(2D) 2 (Tr)(2D) (Tr)= 2 sin - cos
_-_ _ _-_"
For the denonfinator,
1/2
-1/2
x 311/2
3 I-1/2
1
728
The Bottom Line
Solve fi)r _, rearrange terms a_ld substitute in AV and At:
fl-6AV 2 sin (2Xr) - cos (2_, r .
= shear in s -2 over 1 km least - squares line fit to model.
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Concluding Remarks
1. The extremely high correlation coefficients that are obtained
when F or Fx is regressed onto AV/Ar show that the modeled
F-factor and the peak-to-peak divergence are eqltivalent hazard
indices that have different thresholds.
2. Use of A V alone without reference to a length scale severely
limits the potential information content relative to the direct
effect of microburst wind shear on aircraft performance.
3. Use of this model links AV values to some scale length.
U
4. Importance of actual shear distribution and velocity profile is
still unknown.. Simple A V estimats of 15 kts have been shown
to cause aircraft accidents; scaled to 1 nmi, this is olfly about
50% of the F-factor thought to pose a hazard.
5. _ appears to be a significant contribution to the total hazard.
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Summer 1988 TDWR Microburst Analysis
Mark W. Merritt, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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SUMMER 1988 TDWR MICROBURST ANALYSIS*
Mark W. Merritt
MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Lexington, MA 02173
ABSTRACT
N91-11701
The Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) testbed system was operated
during the months of July-August 1988 in a live operational demonstration
providing microburst (and related weather hazard) protection to the Stapleton
International Airport in Denver, CO. During this time period, the perform-
ance of the detection system was carefully monitored in an effort to determine
the reliability of the system. Initial performance analysis indicates that the
microburst detec[ion component of TDWR satisfies the basic performance
goals of 90% probability of detection and 10% probability of false alarm.
An in-depth study of the system performance, based on analysis of both dual-
Doppler radar observations and surface mesonet measurements, is in progress
to provide a detailed understanding of the observability of microbursts by the
radar, the ability of the algorithms to detect microbursts observed by the radar,
and the timeliness and accuracy of the microburst alarms provided to opera-
tional users.
*This work was sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration. The
United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use
thereof.
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Automatic Detection of Low Altitude Wind Shear Due to Gust Fronts in the
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar Operational Demonstration
Diana Klingle-Wilson, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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Automatic Detection of Low Altitude Wind Shear Due to - - _
Gust Fronts in the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar /'z /_
Operational Demonstration*
Diana Klingle-Wilson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory
Lexington, MA 02173
ABSTRACT
A gust front is the leading edge of the cold air outflow from a thunderstorm. Wind
shears and turbulence along the gust front may produce potentially hazardous conditions
for an aircraft on takeoff or landing such that runway operations are significantly im-
pacted. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has therefore determined that the
detection of gust fronts in the terminal environment be an integral part of the Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) system. Detection of these shears by the Gust Front
Algorithm permits the generation of warnings that can be issued to pilots on approach
and departure. In addition to the detection capability, the algorithm provides an estimate
of the wind speed and direction following the gust front (termed wind shift) and the
forecasted location of the gust front up to 20 minutes before it impacts terminal opera-
tions. This has shown utility as a runway management tool, alerting runway supervisors to
approaching wind shifts and the possible need to change runway configurations.
The formation and characteristics of gust fronts and their signatures in Doppler radar
data will be discussed. A brief description of the algorithm and its products for use by
Air Traffic Control (ATC), along with an assessment of the algorithm's performance
during the 1988 Operational Test and Evaluation, will be presented.
The work described here was sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration. The
United States Government assumes no liability for its content or use thereof.
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Sam Saint, Safe Flight
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SAFE FLIGHT
SOME PERSPECTIVE ON THE WIND SHEAR PROTECTION PROBLEM
Sam Saint
Aviation Consultant
Second Combined Manufacturers and Technology
Airborne Wind Shear Review Meeting
Sponsored by NASA/FAA
October 18-20, 1988
Fort Magruder
Williamsburg, Virginia
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SAFE FLIGHT
What we have accomplished and what yet
remains to be done.
Not everyone yet realizes what a landmark decision FAA
made when they went into the Federal Register with a new
regulation mandating ONBOARD WIND SHEAR PROTECTION.
The FAA action taken last month was absolutely right.
This is clearly the first giant step along the road to total
wind shear protection.
We have come a long way.
Unfortunately, however, there is a residue of misunder-
standing about the role of the onboard protection now mandated
by FAA.
That residue of misunderstandingwas put in print in the
AP story of FAA's order "to equip all ... planes with devices
that will help pilots detect and escape from deadly shifts in
the wind." This was the AP story filed on September 22nd, as
reported in the NY Times on September 23rd.
Describing the wind shear disaster at Dallas-Fort Worth
in August of 1985, the AP story said the newly mandated
equipment "tells the pilot when the plane is in the midst of
conditions as dangerous as those at Dallas-Fort Worth in
1985." Then comes this sentence: "By that time, critics of the
equipment suggest, ... it may already be too late ..."
The last paragraph of the AP story (as it appeared in the
NY Times) reads this way:
"Many pilots insist that it is virtually impossible to
escape a powerful microburst like the one that struck the
Delta plane at Dallas-Fort Worth or the one encountered by a
Pan American World Airways jetliner that crashed as it was
taking off from New Orleans in 1982."
The AP story is wrong on two counts.
The assertion that a warning when the plane is "in the
midst of [the microburst] conditions ... may already be too
late," is wrong, as I will show you in moment.
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And, the AP story, quoting "many pilots", implies that
use of the mandated equipment would, maybe, not have saved
either the Pan American disaster at New Orleans, or the Delta
tragedy at Dallas-Fort Worth.
This is a totally wrong conclusion, as I think many of
you here in this room already know.
To put it bluntly, there are still some people who
believe the onboard "reactive" systems FAA has now mandated
are simply another "band-aid" solution, to give some protec-
tion while we wait for the real solution from the ground-based
and/or airborne "look-ahead" systems they insist we really
want.
We could talk about how these erroneous ideas got
started, but this would not be fruitful today. What we really
want is a clear answer to each of three questions:
One, will the warning the pilot gets from the currently
mandated equipment come too late?
Two, will the warning the pilot gets from the currently
mandated equipment give the pilot the capability of escaping
from microbursts like that at JFK on June 24th, 1975, like New
Orleans on July 9th, 1982, and like Dallas-Fort Worth on
August 2nd, 1985? These three worst wind shear disasters
since 1975 cost 401 lives and many hundreds of millions of
dollars in liability claims. Would the protection now ordered
by FAA have saved those lives and kept those three airlines
out of the courts?
The third question is this: Will the currently mandated
onboard, "reactive" systems become obsolete if and when a
"look-ahead" system is perfected?
I first heard what I believe to be the correct answer to
this third question from Roland Bowles in the hallway at 800
Independence Avenue during a coffee break. Before I talk
about this third question, though, let me give you a solid
answer to the first two questions.
Let me answer both of these question with one concrete
argument. The currently mandated warning will not come too
late, and the mandated equipment, including recovery
guidance, would, beyond question, have kept EA-66, PAA-759,
and DL-191 out of those smoking headlines.
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Give me a moment to back that statement up.
First I need to point out that calling this currently
mandated equipment a "reactive" system is an unfortunate
choice of words. The so called "reactive" systems will give
the pilot an absolute determination that the outside environ-
ment is doing something that is outside the limits of normal
turbulence. And this warning will be given many critically
important seconds before the pilot can judge the situation
from his normal instrumentation. Perhaps the most important
of all, the spoken words (Wind Shear! Wind Shear! Wind
Shear!) from the cockpit loudspeaker, going into the Cockpit
Voice Recorder, will take peer p[essure off the pilot's back.
He can act, without hesitation, well before "it is too late."
A closer look at the accident record will make this
clear. Let me give some examples:
EA-66 at JFK on June 24th, 1975 -
The initial warning (based on energy gain) would have
come 20 seconds before these pilots realized what was hap-
pening. The warning would have come on the basis of a sud-
denly increasing headwind, with the airplane 420 feet above
the ground, ballooning above the glide path, with a headwind
of 17 knots and an updraft of 300 feet per minute.
Full power, plus commanded pitch guidance for escape, at
that point on the approach would certainly, beyond any
question, have kept that aircraft out of the approach lights.
What actually happened was disastrously different. The
Captain did not call for go-around power until two seconds
before impact.
Without the mandated protection, I believe this could
have happened to any pilot. It could have happened to me.
The pilot needs the help we are now going to give him.
The mandated warning would have been a "prediction" of
the potential danger that lay ahead. I say again, "reactive"
is a misleading word.
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Continental-426, a takeoff at Denver on
August 7th, 1975 -
This pilot would have been warned when 22 seconds into
his takeoff roll, with a ground speed at that moment of 70
knots. The warning would have come on the basis of an
increasing headwind shear of 7 knots per second, while he '
still had more than 8000 feet to get stopped.
Allegheny,121, an attempted go-around at
Philadelphia on June 23rd, 1976 -
Again, on the basis of a sharply increasing headwind,
this pilot would have been warned and would have started his
go-around while still 270 feet in the air, looking at an
airspeed of 160 knots. With the recovery guidance system to
prevent the disastrous, near zero angle of attack at the
critical part of the escape maneuver, there is just no way
this aircraft would have made a 10-G crash landing in the
middle of the airport.
Continental-63, a takeoff at Tucson on
June 23rd_ 1977 -
This aircraft ran through utility poles and wires 710
feet beyond the end of the runway.
For Continental Flight 63, the computed warning would
have come from the cockpit loudspeaker 26 seconds into the
takeoff roll. The groundspeed at that moment was 90 knots.
There was approximately 4500 feet of runway left in which to
stop.
No problem.
Pan American-759, a takeoff at New Orleans
on July 9th_ 1982 -
In this case, the warning would have come right at lift
off. Thanks to Dr. Fujita's comprehensive analysis of this
record, we can determine that full power, plus commanded pitch
guidance, would have seen this aircraft cross the tree line
that brought it down with a margin of 130 feet.
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UAL-633_ a takeoff at Denver on May 3rd, 1984 -
This takeoff hit the ILS antenna 1074 feet beyond the end
of the runway. There is no way you can come closer to total
disaster and keep on going.
These pilots would have been warned in time to have
coasted to a stop. A hairy near miss would have been turned
into a relaxed operation.
Delta-191 at DFW on August 2nd_ 1985 -
The implication that this disastrous accident could not
have been prevented by the currently mandated wind shear
protection is wide of the mark. Not by any stretch of
imagination can this implication have any validity.
The Flight Data Recorder on this aircraft was recording
42 parameters every second. Dr. Ted Fujita's total analysis
of this accident is available between hard covers. I have
flown a near duplication of this microburst four times in
simulation.
For those Delta pilots, the initial warning would have
come 18 long seconds before they knew the desperate trouble
that lay ahead. This initial warning (based on energy gain)
would have come 35 seconds before initial impact, while the
aircraft was still 770 feet above the ground, with an airspeed
at that moment of 173 knots.
With full power at that point, gear up, and go-around
flaps, there is just no way that Ed Conners and his big flying
machine could have wound up in a smoking heap on millions of
TV tubes.
Let me add a personal word here -
I was an airline pilot for 33 years. If I had been in
command of that L-1011 at DFW -- an aircraft that did not have
the protective technology we now know how to provide -- it is
highly likely that I too would have wound up in that great
fireball against those water tanks.
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There is a point we need to clear up with
the aviation community -
Gentlemen, with the prestige of this meeting, with the
prestige of the NASA/FAA Team, we need to tell the world that
the mandated, onboard wind shear protection systems should not
be called "reactive" systems. This word still speaks to some
people of a warning that is "too late".
Again and again, it is seen in the accident record that
these new systems will give pilots enough lead time to change
a potential disaster into a safe escape.
We should tell the aviation community that this currently
mandated equipment is not a "band-aid" solution. We are not
talking about a "crash alarm", as some have suggested. We are
talking about a solid solution of a difficult and very complex
problem.
That leads us to the third question we
asked earlier -
Will the currently mandated equipment become obsolete if
and when the "look-ahead" (Doppler, laser, Lidar, infrared --
airborne or ground-based) systems become available?
Careful examination makes it clear that Roland Bowles at
NASA and Herb Schlickenmaier at FAA have been right all along.
Roland was the first to say this in my hearing: The
"reactive" systems already flying with FAA certification will
not be throw-away technology.
We need to say, with the considerable force of these
important, NASA/FAA sponsored meetings -- we need to tell the
aviation community that the currently mandated equipment forms
a solid foundation to which additional improvements should be
made as they come along.
Nowf a word about what ye t remains to be done -
Four of the eight accidents in the NTSB records, from
EA-66 in 1975 to DL-191 in 1985, were takeoff accidents.
Clearly, we need protection from a microburst encounter
during the takeoff roll. But there is a problem that has not
yet been resolved.
782
SAFE FLIGHT
At least one major airframe manufacturer and two major
airlines have argued that a wind shear warning system must be
deactivated during the critical phase of a takeoff. The fear
is, of course, that an aborted takeoff could be triggered
that might turn into a disaster. The threat of liability
looms like a specter in the background.
I can understand this fear. It is a valid concern. Two
engineering pilots, whose judgment I regard very highly, have
told me that we need to resolve the total runway monitoring
problem before we can allow the wind shear warning system to
be enabled during the most critical part of the takeoff roll.
I agree that this is an unsolved problem that still lies
ahead. Complete runway monitoring will involve many factors
other than a possible microburst encounter. With today's
technology, however, I believe we can solve the runway moni-
toring problem.
Let me put my Safe Flight hat on for one
final minute -
I want to say I am proud to be a member of the Safe
Flight Instrument Corporation team.
Safe Flight was years ahead of everyone else in arriving
at the correct basic concept for a warning system. Safe
Flight was first to understand that the horizontal and
vertical winds at the outer edge of a microburst should be
measured to provide the earliest possible look at the
"footprint" -- the "signature" -- of the hazard that lies
ahead.
Seven years ago, when I was catapulted into this problem,
Safe Flight stood alone in having a clear understanding of
what we now know to be the way the threat should be measured.
There were many other approaches being pursued. Today, there
is a strong consensus that the basic concept pioneered by Safe
Flight is the correct approach to an onboard warning system.
And this basic concept meets the requirements of FAA's new
rule.
Safe Flight was the first to seriously argue that the
pilot needs computed recovery guidance, and to provide that
guidance.
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Safe Flight was the first to argue for wind shear protec-
tion during the takeoff roll, and to develop that protection.
All through the years of the jet era, _ we have known that
speed targets provided an inadequate signal for the extremely
critical takeoff decision points.
In the course of working toward microburst protection
during the takeoff roll, Safe Flight has invented and now
offers "Runway Rotation Guidance". This is rotation command
based on real world inputs of both ground speed and airspeed.
This, I firmly believe, will eventually replace the totally
inadequate speed targets for marking the last safe abort point
and the point at which rotation should take place.
Thank you for listening.
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I'm not real sure what Herb meant when he gave me the title, "Lessons Learned"
here. I thought maybe I was supposed to give a test. It's always a pleasure to follow
Sam, of course, because I've known Sam for a long time. I'm going to take the
opportunity to echo some of the things that he said. I want to really present an
overview of the Safety Board's views and progress made to date and some observations
on the discussions that I've heard during the last couple of days. But before that I
want to mention a probable cause.
About two years ago, out at the SAE Aerospace Technology Conference in Long
Beach, I opened the panel on wind shear. I think a lot of the people here were in
the audience and I read a probable cause. The probable cause that I read was, "loss
of control of the aircraft due to unusually severe turbulence and violent down draft
caused by a thunderstorm of unknown and unpredictable intensity." Since I'm
following Sam, I'll tell this story. Shortly before or after, I can't recall which, I was
preparing this speech, Sam was in my office and I read that probable cause to Sam
and I didn't know exactly which accident he would associate it with. Without blinking
an eye, Sam said "Oh yea, I remember it was back in 1943 and it was Captain So and
So" (I don't know the captain's name but I venture to say he does) and anyhow, it was
July 28, 1943, it was an American Airlines DC3 which encountered a thunder storm
near Bowling Green, Kentucky, while enroute at low altitude between Louisville and
Nashville. The significant part of that accident report (I dug that accident report out
in preparation for that speech) was that back in 1943 there was a very accurate
description of a microburst. It wasn't called a microburst, but the accident described
the constrained high velocity down draft diverging out (that was evident by ground
damage) the trees blown, damage to the ground which was fanned out in a wide range
and it was very evident that unlike somebody said earlier that people didn't recognize
the microburst hazards, they actually did. In fact, there were a couple of
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recommendations that came out of that report and they were that we needed to
conduct research from the dynamics of thunderstorms, and the development of
accurate methods of forecasting severe developments. Another one was that there had
to be further studies of the behavior of airplanes passing through a verticle downdraft
and into a tail wind. I think most of the people here know that the NTSB tracks
recommendations and the actions being taken to close them out and we grade them
as acceptable actions or unacceptable but I think we've approached the point some
45 years later where we can probably close those recommendations out now.
Obviously progress hasn't been steady during that period of time and even though
there were some people and Bill Melvin was one, some of the NASA people, George
Spectal I think from Huntsville and there's some people from Ames and Captain
Brown from TWA, there were papers that were put out certainly during that period,
in the 60s and before the early 70s. But in the early 70s the whole wind shear
problem started to be recognized by industry and government. Although the Iberia
DC10 accident at Boston Logan in 1973 was actually a funnel system wind shear, not
something that would normally infringe upon the performance capability of the
airplane. It was certainly a wind shear accident and it infringed upon the Captain's
interface with the condition he was going through and that prompted a lot of attention
within the industry. Eastern 66 that Sam referred to came along in 1975 and that
really got people's attention. Ted Fujita and Fernando Carecina among others started
coining words like microburst, downburst, and the whole aviation community became
very intensely interested in the subject. I think that I can honestly say that we have
seen steady progress since 1975 in addressing the problem, although it's certainly been
spurt),. It's been accelerated in 1982 with the Kenner accident and it accelerated again
in 1985 with the Delta Dallas Forth Worth accident. But back in 1975, people
recognized that there was a need for a lot of research. There was a need for
development of ground based detection equipment, there was a need for the
development of airborne detection equipment and there certainly was a need for
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training so that brings us up to 13 years later. I'm not intending to be critical that
it's taken 13 years, but I think we have to recognize that there's a lot of technological
hurdles that had to be overcome and there's still a lot of them that have to be
overcome. There are budget priorities that we're contending with, we've got problems
other than wind shear. We've got airborne collisions and a whole host of places to
spend money. Government procurement is obviously not necessarily completely
efficient, I guess I should say, and rule making takes time, so we've made progress.
There's no doubt about that and I think the Safety Board views that progress with a
lot of encouragement. The progress has been evident.
We've heard a lot about it here the last couple of days. In 1987 when we had
the enhanced LLWAS test out at Stapleton that certainly was a vast improvement over
what we had seen in LLWAS in the past and we've got to hustle and get that system
in more places. I understand now that it is in New Orleans, but it still has time to go.
The TDWR tests, we've heard an awful lot of in the last past couple of days and
that's been more than encouraging. The NEXRAD terminal and NEXRADS are
coming along. They're under contract and under production I guess. The TDWR
itself (I don't know if the contract has been let yet) is imminent. So that sure is
encouraging. The ASR9; I think perhaps the wind shear community hasn't paid quite
as much attention as it should to the implementation of the ASR9 and the features
that it's going to bring for places where we don't get the Terminal Doppler and how
they integrate it with the LLWAS. I was encouraged this morning when Art Hanson
at least touched upon that pretty much. It was kind of encouraging to think that it
is being thought about someplace. Flight crew training aides were delivered to the
FAA, February 1987, a year and a half ago, almost two years ago. That represented
a very intensive effort by the manufacturers in the community. I agree with Sam that
the rule making that's just been passed is a landmark rule making because we certainly
need that training as well as the reactive, in situ devices that Sam is talking about.
The Safety Board supported that rule making very strongly and we supported the
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reactive devicesand both the detection and the guidanceaspectsof it. Like we know
that in the preamble there wasa lot of controversial commentsabout the need for the
guidance,but in our view, so long asyou have airplanes flying with speed command,
alpha command and flight directors, we have to do something to improve the crew's
chancesof executing a successfulescapemanuever and that requires this guidance.
The forward looking sensors,the discussionshere were very interesting. There's a lot
of good technologyand we certainly want to seethat program move forward. It seems
to me that there are still a lot of hurdles that need to be overcome. I certainly
disagree that we should have waited until those systemscame along before *we went
into rule making with the presently available devices. And in fact, I've heard some
comments during this discussion from various people here and outside where they've
expressed concern that this rule making that's on the presently available devices is
going to inhibit development or can potentially inhibit development of the forward
looking devices. Why, I certainly hope not. But I thought it was interesting when
Howard Long, at some point yesterday, brought up the question of what happens when
the down draft, a very intensive downdraft, descends on the airplane rather than the
airplane running into it. I think that we've see that in some of the wind shear
incidents we've investigated. I'm not sure about the accidents but I do know we've
investigated incidents where pilots had clear visibility, had no signs of constrained rain
shaft ahead of them and then all of sudden they're deluged in rain and they've got the
wind shear effect. So the forward looking sensors may not always do the trick. One
is not going to substitute for the other in my view.
I want to make a couple of observations on the discussions during the last few
days, Bob Ireland was up here a couple of days ago and was talking about the July
11 incident at Stapleton. That brought about a lot of discussion from the people in
the audience about the controller's and the pilot's performance, which it wasn't
intended by Bob, I'm sure. But I think it pointed out that there is a lesson to be
learned. We have a lot of human factors work to do and I'm not sure that I want to
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use the words total in the human factors side but we have a lot of work to do where
we get air traffic controllers, pilots and everybody involved and we've been doing this.
When we talk about the controllers job, it's always kind of interesting to me that we
focus in only on the subject at hand, wind shear in this case. The NTSB on the other
hand, we have to focus in on the runway encouraging problems, the operational errors
and everything else. We have to recognize, even though we may not always appear
to, that the controller has one heck of a work load these days. They're limited in
experience, limited from the standpoint that they may be very well trained but it's been
basically a rebuild effort since 1981, they're handling more traffic now they ever did
before and their primary concern, irrespectable of what this group might think, is to
keep those airplanes apart and that's a big job for them. The point I'm trying to
make there is that I don't think we're going to reach the day where you can look to
a controller to be able to understand the performance problems facing a pilot, his
aircraft. I don't think you're going to be able to look to him (even though we'd like
to think he'd have better meteorology training than he has) to do a lot of
interpretation of weather data. So we're going to have to come with the tools that
give him a very objective way in which to make decisions. If we ever put the decision
in the tower and the FAA legal people, the people who decide to suspend operations
as a result of any of these readings, will do so because there's an objective way of
measuring it and there's a no go light there. The controllers subjectivity is not going
to be an issue. Obviously, the July 11 incident pointed out the need to do a little
more work on the message format but that was the purpose of that operational
demonstration program. What we felt was that there was going to have to be more
work done and there is a TDWR LLWAS user group that's certainly going to continue
with that. Bob was asked the question (somewhat leading question) at the end of his
presentation,., would there have been an accident had there not been a TDWR and
the warning devices and I tend to agree with Bob. I hope he's right that there
wouldn't have been but I'm not sure that I agree with him that it's necessarily for the
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samereason. Thosepilots involved were trained, they had beenthrough the simulator,
they probably instinctively knew a little bit better how to react than pilots who perhaps
had not received the intensive training. But they could also see the ground and in the
accidents that Sam's mentioning (the Eastern JFK Pan Am encounter and Delta
Dallas, and just about every one of those cases) we felt that the pilot's visibility was
just about nil when he entered the rain shaft and he didn't have the altitude
awareness. That's one of the things that really bothered me in Bob assessment when
he said that one of the pilots he'd talked to hadn't realized that he had gotten so low.
We read out the play data recorders from those airplanes and they did get pretty low.
The heavy rain effort itself is .. it's certainly interesting. We strongly support Earl
Dunham's work. I thought he had an interesting presentation. We have to continue
to establish what the stall margins are in heavy rain. We've looked into it in a
theoretical sense after the Delta 191 accident in analysis, but we don't know what the
rain fall rate for sure was in that. But we did look at .. we had a good enough flight
data recorder that we could look at longitude or acceleration and air speed rate and
back out some of the wind defects and then look at the theoretical lift coefficients and
see whether there were any rain effects. We didn't see the 30%, certainly that Earl
was showing here. In fact, we saw very little. Since a lot of the discussion here
concerned views on the compatibility of the ground based systems and the airborne
systems (Wayne Sands brought that up this morning) I frankly, personally, believe that
it's a worthy objective to get those systems compatible. But I'm probably not as much
worried as I've heard some other people indicate *that they have to be perfectly
compatible. I think that these events will be rare enough that the pilots have to be
trained now, irrespectable of which one gives the warning, he's going to hate it and
there certainly are times when you're going to be warned from a ground based system.
You won't see it on an airborne system or look ahead airborne system or even an in
situ system so I don't think it's really achievable that you're going to get complete
compatibility. But that has to be covered by training. Ultimately, I suspect that we
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ought to be looking at a way for the data link to get the systems talking to each other
so there's really no need for compatibility. A pilot sees a warning and regardless of
whether it comes from the ground based system or the airborne system, he's trained
to do something about it. I hear people talk about using the F factor hazard index
and it's certainly a part of the algorithm to go into any of these systems as detection
modes. I certainly don't agree with that there's any need to give the pilot an F factor
hazard index. He's got enough to think about when he's just coming in and trying
to relate the level. In fact, we take the view that where anything says there's a
microburst, it's "get out',, don't evaluate whether your airplane has performance to try
to penetrate it. Pat Cline was mentioning the false and nuisance alarms after the
presentation by Terry Zwiefiel. I'm certainly hopeful that those problems, if there are
any, can be solved. I thought the data that was put up by Terry where there one
alarm in, I think, 20,000 plus flights, certainly indicated a rarity of the events to the
point that nuisance alarms is not going to be all that critical, but there were a lot of
analogies made to the GPWS. The GPWS was put into service and those people who
say it was put into service prematurely, from the Safety Board's standpoint, we will
argue against that violently, because it undoubtedly started preventing accidents as soon
as it went into service. The evolution of the performance of those systems, you very
seldom hear complaints these days. Some of these guys might take issue with that, but
that's my view.
Again, I've heard discussion that the rule for the reactive devices will inhibit
industry's development of the lo0k ahead system. I certainly hope not. I think that
industry has to continue to strive just like they do from going from black and white
to color radar and the turbulence modes on radar. There are going to be constant
improvements in the systems and all the technologies being discussed here have to be
given a chance. But the systems have to complement each other to the extent that
the reactive systems and the guidance should complement the onboard look ahead
systems. It brings me to where we are and what's still needed. I think Wayne did
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a pretty good wrap up of what's still needed today. We generally concur with him.
The enhanced LLWAS -- there has to be work there. We're strong advocates of
getting sensors out on the approach and departure path because even with the
expanded array within the airport boundary, we're going to miss some critical events
that could cause accidents and I think that's well recognized in the FAA and like
Craig said, it's a budget and resource problem. I'm sure there's going to be a day,
probably pretty soon, when we're going to look at priorities and whether systems have
to be enhanced and it's going to be weighed whether there's a TDWR there or
whether there isn't, whether there's an ASR9 and a lot can be done, probably, to
combine the ASR9 and LLWAS (without a TDWR to improve the situation where the
TDWR is not going to be installed) I was encouraged this morning to hear Art
Hanson talk about the geographic situation display in the tower because this is the first
meeting I've been to where it's been indicated that that's part of the FAA's plans.
That has been really kind of a concern because I think the test at Denver proved that
that's a very useful piece of equipment. Ultimately, it is the type of display that you
might want to send up to the airplane.
The LLWAS TDWR message format I've mentioned, the use of the ASR9 I've
mentioned and I think the only other thing I didn't hear this morning but I'm sure it
will be coming along is the presentation of the TDWR display on the controller's
BRITE. At the last meeting I attended I also heard that was not part of the FAA's
plan but I certainly hope that becomes part of their plans.
The development of a controller training program as these systems get
implemented is a must. They might not be able to make pilots and meteorologists out
of them but we can at least the controller thinking towards the pilot problems. But
more than that, we also have to continue to develop a data link so that we take some
of the work load off his shoulder.
The 1988 season is over and I think everybody breathes a sigh of relief when the
thunderstorm season ends, but we've got several more years to go where a situation
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at most of the airports are going to be exactly the same as they were at Dallas Forth
Worth in '85 and in Kenner in '82. So there's no substitute for awareness and training
and that's the only thing we're going to have going for us in the next few years so we
have to concentrate on them.
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A recent study by Dr. Anqelo Miete and the Aero-Astronaut_cs
Group of Rice University entitled "Effect of Pitch Rate on Abort
Landing Windshear Encounters" shows that high p_ tch rates
(greater than 3/4 degrees per second) will adverse,'.y affect
flight path performance in strong wind shears close to the ground
(Figures I through 5). This study of a typical ]el transport
aircraft for the landing case is an offshoot of the Optimal
Trajectory Studies by the Rice University group which is funded
in part by NASA Langley under" the directi.on of Dr-. Roland Bowles.
This should call to question the advice in the FAA W).nd Shear
training Aid (WSTA) for pilots to rotate "at a normal rate" [o a
prescribed pitch, a proceOure known as the constant pitch
technique which was also used for tlqe Rice University study.
"Normal rate" is defined and under-stood by pilots to be 2 to 3
degrees per second which is much too fast far the landing case in
a severe shear. In modest wind shears, pitch rate has little
effect upon flight path per-formance. A higher- pitch rate may be
required for initial rotation at takeoff, but for encounters
after takeoff an initial pitch reduction followed by a qradu_)l
pitch increase more closely approximates an optimal tra]ectory.
Borrowing a figure from Dr-. None Barrios' presentation (Figt_re 6)
which is in close agreement with the optimal trajectory studies
at Rice University, it is evident that his altitude profile for
deliberate flight at the stick shaker angle of attack (curve no.
2) is a very poor strategy. One must. question then the advice
from the WSTA to remain at the stick shaker angle of attack after
it is initially encountereo.
A new study by the Rice University group, yet to be published,
should reveal the optimal trajectory after reaching the st. ic:k
shaker angle of attack. ]his study is also an offshoot of the
optimal tr-ajectory studies and is funded by the Aviation Research
and Education Foundation.
Examination of Barrios' curve no. 4 (constant pitch technique)
shows that in this very strong wind shear there comes a time wher_
the pitch can no longer be maintained at the prescribed value of
15 degrees and the flight path becomes negative. Th:.s effect is
also shown in Dick Bray's paper. However, the WSTA tells a pilot
that if at the target pitch and if the flight pat_ is not
satisfactory then the pitch should be increased. This can be art
impossible task which holds out a false hope to pilots.
A correlation is shown in Figure 7 between aircraft performar_e
and the F factor where aircraft performance is des(zri!]ed by a
constant airspeed. Also shown (Figure 8) are some [ _m11 ing
conditions of aircraft performance which reveal some, values far
Pi,_ECEL3iNG PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
799
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OFPOOR QUALITY
below the planned alert level of some aircraft warning systems.
As pointed out by Dr. Bowles, in a wind shear an aircraft can in
fact escape a condition exceeding the limiting value by trading
airspeed. Nevertheless, some consideration to these limiting
conditions should be given when designing alert levels and in
prescribing escape procedures, especially recommendations to not
change the high drag landing flap configurations in some cases.
What pilots want in wind shear instrumentation is a device which
assists us. We will know about meteorological and operational
conditions which the machine is not going to know. We do not need
a decision maker, but rather an information device. Some devices,
designed to not have false alarms, in fact do not have false
alarms, but they do not protect against wind shear encounters.
Others which do protect may have nuisance alerts. We accept this
as long as we evaluate the alerts and use our judgement. We also
want alerts on positive performance encounters and when on the
ground.
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AIRBUS WINDSHEAR WARNING AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM
i. AIRBUS WINDSHEAR PHILOSOPHY
From its first designed airplane, Airbus considered mandatory an help in
the crew's decision-making process to initiate an escape manoeuvre end an
help to successfully realize it.
For doing so forth all the Airbus airplanes are designed since 1975
including alpha-floor function and speed reference control law imbedded
in the SRS box for A 300 end FAC and FCC for A 310, A300/600 and the A
320.
Alpha-Floor function takes into account airplane energy situation
considering angle of attack and observed longitudinal situation in order
to apply immediately the full power without any pilot action.
Speed reference managers airspeed and/or ground speed in order to survive
a maximum in shear situation.
In order to comply with the new FAA regulation: Aerospatiale and Airbus
developed more efficient new systems.
The following part of this presentation is a comparison between 1975 and
newly developed system and explains how the new system does improve the
situation.
2. WINDSHEAR GUIDANCE STRATEGIES
Analog A 300's and digital h 310's and h 300-600's (AFCS standards 5-6-7)
have a very well known and similar SRS guidance law (Basic 1975
situation).
From our experience we confirm thaff this strategy is precise enough to
survive many shears. In some strong shear cases it is however completed
by an OEB procedure for disregarding FD bars at some point.
Safetywise analog and digital systems also do comply with the AC 25.12.
The basic Airbus Windshear guidance is favorable but can be improved.
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We therefore defined a fully adaptive system that is able to cope with strong shears without any special
procedure at all.
Initially we tried to develop and optimal guidance system but we reached very quickly for impossible
solutions •
First" optimal guidance procedures really are different from one shear to another, in some cases the
system initially even demanding to dive.
Second • guidance is really optimal if we have the full knowledge of the whole shear pattembefore
penetrating it.
Third' which in fact is the conclusion of the second point • iq any shear encounter an optimal guidance
system has to bet on the future.
For all these reasons we developed a repetitive and adaptive survival strategy (Figure 2) adapted to all
performance problems in typical shear conditions.
The system is derived from the A 300 SRS System (Figure 3) improved by a vertical speed floor
protection, by a Vmini protection and by a stall protection.
This Control law realizes the survival strategy (Figure 4) whatever be the longitudinal or vertical shear
stressing the aircraft capability in take off or go around conditions.
The Control law implemented in the FCC's SRS take off go around mode is available on flight director,
CWS or command.
In shear conditions and when shear intensity stresses the aircraft's, capability, the SRS law will
progressively adapt its control to a survival strategy •
1 - Basic vote (n°l) will control airspeed (Vsel + 10 Kt) with a vertical speed decreasing to
zero.
2 - Vote n=2then over controls vote n° 1 and commands a slightly positive vertical speed
with an airspeed decreasing down to V stick shaker plus a small A.
3 - Vote n"3 then overcontrols vote n=2 and vote n° 1, controls airspeed at Vss + &. The
altitude will be reduced until the shear decreases.
Whatever commanded strategy, pitch attitude demand is limited by a stall protection to avoid
impending any stall situation.
3 - AIRBUS GUIDANCE SITUATIONS
The most severe shears proposed inAC 120.41 windfietd models were simulated in the take off phase
both with the initial A 300 SRS system and with me newly developed windshear guidance system
(called here control of aircratt's energy),
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Comparing _igures 5 and 6 we conclude that the new system really _oes
improve the situation but that the initial A 300 SRS was already well
effective in its capability to cope with a real encounter.
Figures 7 and 8 emphasize the advantages presented by the new system in
theoretical shear conditions: an adaptive control law maintains the
aircraft inside the operational flight envelope and uses maximum airplane
capability to achieve this.
The control law is implemented in the A 300-600 AFCS since A/C MSN 420 and
for the A 310 it will be in the 89 first part. In principle the control
law is available for retrofit to all aircraft from the digital fleet.
From simulation experience we know that for take off with derated power
or for the landing case a successful escape manoeuvre can be accomplished
if max power or go around decision is promptly decided upon entering the
shear.
This remark just to focus on the absolute need for a tool to trigger the
crew's decision-making process to initiate escape.
Windshear detection can provide this valuable help; but what do we have to
detect what nuisance warning level should we reach to maintain an
acceptable level of crew confidence with regard to the warning.
All those aspects were kept in mind to define an Airbus windshear warning
philosophy from in-flight incldent/accident analyses.
4- AIRBUS WINDSHEAR WARNING
Airbus targets (Figure 9) enhances AC 25.12 aclvices in detection, non-detection and performance
nuisance warnings.
An evident design phy]osophy with regard to warnings was to define a wind severity factor computation
(SF).
d Enerqy Weight _C re- Airspeed x d Wx + g.W z !
ol = -- ol _
SF - r d Wx g
, dt " Airspeed x Wzi
Intuitively this reflects the instantaneous loss of energy due to the gloloal shear (longitudinal & vertical)
ifSF> 0.
Wx = longitudinal wind < 0 IF heaclwind
Wz : vertical wind < 0 IF clown
Cte : function of A/C propulsion and aerodynamics (typical to each airplane)
G : gravity acceleration
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SF could be filtered and compared to a fixed threshold of 2.5 kts/sec or 0.13 g typically.
This conventionally adopted solutionswas however rapidly abandonned due to a high level of nuisance
warnings.
Wind variations knowledge is in fact the only parameterfor a shear intensity evaluation but can never be
the unique information in a windshear warning without duly taking into accound the aircraft's energy
situation.
Windshear Warning computed without considering actual aircraft energy will lead, in certain cases of
shear encounter, to very early warnings (the crew should identify them like nuisance warning) or will
lead to too late warnings endangering an escape manoeuvre.
A good crew confidence level and a satisfactory escape manoeuvre capability can both be reached by a
winclshear warning as a reasonable compromise between "SF", aircraft's actual energy and a safe
minimal energy.
5 - WIND SHEAR WARNING (WSW) COMPUTATION PRINCIPLE
The WSW is activated when the predicted aircraft's energy is below a predetermined minimal energy
threshold (Figure 10).
This threshold corresponds to still air a floor protection in accordance with Flaps and Slats
position.
a = a + aw
The predicted aircraft's energy depends on C " which is obtained considering filtered angle of attack
(AOA orE[ ) corresponding to the actual aircraft's energy situation increased by equivalent angle of
attack estimates (E.AOA.E) a W.
a w is an estimate of the energy loss foreseable in the close future.
Note than the higher is AOA (a) the lower is the actual aircraft energy and the higher is E.AOA.E (C[W)
the higher will be the future loss of energy,
aw is obtained by a combination of equivalent angles of attack estimates :
.,_- is the due {oE.AOA.E instantaneous tailwind shear
,_,- E.AOA.E of the recent headwind shear.is a memorized
Generally a strong heactwind is precursor of a strong decreasing shear.
,.._ - is an E.AOA.E decrease according to the mean wind observed in order to alleviate
turbulence nuisance warnings
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a_ - is an E.AOA E related to the observed vertical downward wind.
a, b, c, d, E.AOA.E's cannot be negative
b minus c cannot be negative
aW=a÷d+(b-c) ifa>0
This windshear warning mechanization is schematized on figure 11.
In areas I, IZ and III, E.AOA E's are computed but C ° is identical to AOA since a < 0 (no tail wind
shear)
CI" combines AOA and C,W
In area TV"when vertical wind becomes negative : d • 0
In area V C'W'increases when tailwind shear appears.
In that case WSW threshold is reached. It could have been reached in area IV ifvertical wind intensity
would have been higher. Similarly, it coulcl also have been reached in area V with tailwind shear
depending on shear intensity.
Simulator experience shows that short after lift off below 250 tt it is useful to trigger the WSW
according to the tail shearfor the case of a small margin regarding to 1,2 Vs. For clarification purpose,
this function is not shown on these figures but is should be reminded that from lift off to 250 ft WSW
compared to acan occur from (I "or from the _ branch only smaller threshold if Vc < 1,2 Vs + 5
Kt. v
6 - PERFORMANCE WARNING
6-1 - PERFORMANCE NUISANCE WARNING
We considered both take off and landing cases but we limit intentionna_ly here our evaluation to the
most disturbing case for air traffic and aircraft's utilisation :the lancling case
Nuisance warning probability by approach had _een evaluated _,ysimulating 5C0 automatic landings
in tower wind conclitions Ul:) to 40 Kts according to AC 20.57 A devices (automatic lancing
performance evaluation). Results are plotted figure 12.
Nuisance warning proi_aioility by approach is plotted for Airbus winc_st_ear warning and for t_e
conventional winclsnear warn=ng(properly filtered "SF" by a 4s tag retere0 in section 4)
We remzm_that a conventional winCshear warnir.g leads :¢ a nuisance !evel of 10"3per lancing with a
rec:mmanCecl thresneid of 0.; 3 g _r 2,5 K',S,sec. We also note that the Ai_us wmCsP,e_r warning
:e_cs :: a r:.u|sar:,ceieveict _,0.5 ;er tanding wsth,ts imr.,lememea threshoiC cf 11,5 =. it ;s interest:_gto
remora=or here that the US in serwce observed w=nc_st_ear;rcbaci;ity encounter iS dimout _0"6
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6-2 - NORMAL PERFORMANCE WARNING
The Airbus WSW will alert the crew after an initial lossof longitudinalairspeed. The closerthe selected
airspeed to 1,3 Vs the smaller this initial loss before the warning is triggered (Figure 13),
Airbus WSW merely alerts the crew but has no activityon throttles or go around, the crew will decide
according to the situation to pursue or to abort when landing otto triggering max power or not at take
off.
a Floor protection is maintained onAirbus being the ultimate protection ifthe crew underestimates the
situation at WSW.
For a windshear encounter case the general situation of Airbus WSW and a FLOOR are plotted on
figure 14. One can notice the remaining energy margin at WSW and at a FLOOR.
In case the pilot wrongly selects too small a speed (1.25 Vs for example) the (ffFLOOR will in same
cases of shear conditions intervene before the warning itself.
7 - AIRBUS WSW AND GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTATION
Since WSW is implemented in each FAC, aural and visual warnings can be tested on ground engines
not running (Figure 15). In a case of shear encounter aural warning is activated and visual windshear
red message displayed on each PFD. Warning can be activated at take off from liftoff to 1000 ft and at
landing from 1000 ft to 50 ft the visual warning will remain for a minimum of 15 s.
The general architecture is given figure 16.
_. JII
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8. A 320 IMPLEMENTATION
Aerospatidle and Airbus develop now very similar control laws for the A
320 taking advantage of managed speed "autothrottle" function for warning
and guidance in order to further decrease nuisance warning level and
increase safety in the escape manoeuvre initiation.
The A 320 system also takes advantage of the fly by wire concept for the
guidance part.
Fly by wire controls, if necessary, the plane into its maximum lift
capability in the final part of the escape while avoiding any stall
situation.
Certification is expected for 1989 in order to comply with the new FAA
regulation process.
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1SRS STRATEGIES
NO SHEAR CONDITIONS
2.
High thrust to
weight ratio
Low thrust to
weight ratio
• SRS controls pitch attitude
max _9 = 18 °
• Climbing slope = cte
• VC increases > V2 + 10 Kts
• SRS controls airspeed
VC = V2 + 10 Kts
(VC = V2 or VEF if VEF>V2) EF case
(Vertical speed > 2,4 % , ,9 < 18 °)
SHEAR CONDITIONS
3
4
Shear does not stress
aircraft capability
Strategy 1 or 2 will control AC
according to shear intensity
and thrust to weight ratio
Shear intensity
stresses aircraft
capability
Control strategy is self adapted to
AC flight parameters •
1 - VC = V2 + 10 Kts control (VZ"--.=0)!
2 - VZ ---0 control (VC"--=VSS + _3)
3-VC=VSS+_V control VZ<0)
i until shear decreases.
Figure2
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AIRBUS WSM SYSTEM TARGETS
Performance
- Detect 106 or < 10-6 simulated cases
- If no detection show the good behaviour of the aircraft
Nuisance
Warning due to active Failure
5.10-6/approach or take off
Lack of warning due to latent Failure
6.10-6/approach or take off
Performance nuisance warning
10-6/approach.
Figure 9
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GROUND TEST
1 or 2 FAC ENGAGED
Engine not running, perform Lamp test
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Windshear encounter non clean config.
and (from take off to 1000 Ft
or from 1000 Ft to 50 R)
and WSW available
1 or 2 FAC ENGAGED
Aural • Windshear 3 times when WSW gets on either FAC 1 or 2.
Visual • Windshear red on both PFD when WSW gets on either FAC 1 or 2 until WSW condition gets
off both FAC 1 and 2 plus 15 s.
AUDIO AND VISUAL WSW
Figure 15
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Session II. Perspective
The "Windvan" Pulsed CO_ Doppler Lidar Wide-Area Wind Sensor
Rhidian Lawrence, Spectra-Technology
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W I DE-AREA W I N D SENSOR 
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LIDARS FOR REMOTE WIND MEASUREMENT
LASERS TR SWITCH
RECEIVER
TELESCOPE/
SCANNER
TO
.-_.ATMOSPHERE
CONTROL
DOPPLER
PROCESSOR
OUTPUT
1 I
A Doppler lidar transmits a pulse of light into the atmosphere via a telescope scanner. The
Doppler-shifted collected light is photomixed with the light from a reference local oscillator
on the surface of a photodetector, which results in an electronic signal at the Doppler
frequency. The required optical beam switching is achieved by the Transmit Receive (TR)
switch. The frequency content of the RF signal is measured by the Doppler Processor and
normalized to yield the radial velocity of the target. A control computer directs the
operation of the lasers, scanner, processor and output devices.
COMPLETE MOBILE WIND MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DEMONSTRATED
BY NOAA/WPL
OTHER APPLICATIONS
• Doppler Laser Radar
• DIAL Measurements of Pollutant Concentration
SPECTRA TECHNOLOGY, INC. PROVIDES:
• Complete Integrated Systems
• Advanced Lasers
• Other Lidar Components
839
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PULSED CO 2 DOPPLER LIDAR SPECIFICATIONS
Listed are top-level hardware and performance specifications. A detailed set of specifications
reflecting your particular requirements will be provided on request.
LASERS: The transmitter laser is a 2 J per pulse, 50-Hz PRF injection-controlled TE laser
operating at 10.6 /_. Injection and local oscillator lasers are 5-W cw devices.
TELESCOPE/SCANNER: The transmlt/recelve telescope is a 0.30-rn diameter off-axls
Cassegraln. Beam scanning is accomplished by an AZ-EL mount to'achieve complete
hemispherical scanning. Scan pattern is programmable.
RECEIVER/TR SWITCH: Transport of transmit beam to the atmosphere, received beam
from the atmosphere to the detector and of the local oscillator to the detector achieved by a
ZnSe Brewster plate, ),/4-plate TR switch. Detector is thermoelectrically cooled.
DOPPLER PROCESSOR: Real time digital Doppler processing, Particular algorithms can
be tailored to customer requirements.
CONTROL: Total instrument control by a central computer.
OUTPUT: Per customer requirements. Options include hard copies of tabular and
graphical wind profiles, computer-controlled color displays and magnetic tape.
INSTALLATION: Per customer requirements, laboratory, mobile or airborne.
TIME FOR VERTICAL WIND PROFILE: 30 s
RANGE RESOLUTION: 150 m
MAXIMUM RADIAL WIND SPEED AND ACCURACY: *50 m/s.*0.3 m/s.
PRICE: Subject to your installation requirements. Spectra Technology would be pleased to
quote on your precise requirements.
PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS:
A CO 2 Doppler lidar is by its very nature a clear air device with limited propagation
capabilities through, e.g.. fog and clouds. In clear air conditions, the range of the device is
dependent on the prevailing atmospheric aerosol _ontent. Typically. the standard performance
model could be expected to achieve a range in excess of 25 km in the boundary layer and
routinely obtain wind profiles to 10 km altitude {i.e.. the troposphere).
EXTENDED PERFORMANCE MODEL:
For support of high value missions at long range and upper altitude an extended performance
version is recommended. Extended performance is achieved in several ways:
• Increased pulse energy and repetition rate (to 5 J and 100 Hz)
• Increased telescope aperture (to 1 m for 10 dB sensitivity gain)
• Isotopic gas mix (to minimize atmospheric absorption and increase aerosol
reflectivity)
Incorporation of all features results in a sensitivity increase of up to 34) dB. STI would be
pleased to quote on your precise requirements.
84O
WIND SENSING USING A DOPPLER LIDAR
Wind sensing using a Doppler.-Jidar is achieved by
sensing the Doppler content of narrow frequency
laser light backscattered by the ambient atmospheric DOPPLER LIDAR
aerosols. The derived radial wind components along
several directions are used to generate wind vectors,
typically using the Velocity Azimuth Display (VAD)
method described below. Rar_ge resolved information
is obtained by range gating the continuous scattered
return. For a CO 2 laser (10.6 /J) the Doppler
velocity scaling factor is 188 kHz/ms "1.
\ / 8E,M,os,o.o.<co<sc
\ _, / v. = .,,,<a,w,nd<om.o...,
\-"/ :
k I Vh = horilonlal wind component
= Vt/2 sinp
=h = direction of horizontal
wind component
- III VAO Principle of Operation
• AEROSOLS
,.,,.'LWIND .. -_:..i:i':,_::,; :",_.:_'_.'_<:.._...
.......! 4, ._.'...;.._,.....:.,. it .,
._::,.._._p,._::.,;-._,., :_._ :,_:....
.._;,..'.OOPPLER-SH,_TEO
,.'_: " BACKSCATTERED ECHO
o.o_."
II/li ""
• i
CONCEPT ,':'"
PULSE OF COHERENT
.LASER RADIATION
In the VAD scan method the zenith angle of the
pointing direction is fixed and and its azimuth is
continuously varied through 2K. A spatially uniform
wind field at a particular altitude yields a sinusoldal
variation of the radial component vs. azimuth. The
amplitude, phase and DC component of this sinusoid
yield the horizontal wind speed, direction and vertical
component of the wind respectively. In a
nonuniform wind field the Fourier components of the
variation yields the required information.
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WIND DIRECTION DEGREES
An extensive series of measurements at the National Weather Service Forecast office at Stapleton
airport, Denver has demonstrated excellent agreement between Doppler lldar and Rawinsonde
outputs.
DATA: Courtesy National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/
Wave Propagation Laboratory
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EXAMPLES OF DOPPLER LIDAR OUTPUT
(Courtesy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/
Wave Propagation Laboratory)
In the PPI display at the right, the velocity in
each range-azimuth cell is color coded according
to the scale at the right. The green-blue scale
indicates flow toward the lidar (located at the
center) and the yellow-red scale flow away from
the lidar. This particular example indicates
west/north westerly flow. Range rings are at
10-kin intervals. Wind measurement to a range
approaching 25 km is indicated.
The dramatic feature at an azimuth of 280 = (as
shown in the photograph on the left) is the
outflow from a down burst. This phenomenon
when it occurs within the landing corridors at
airports can have catastrophic consequences.
The blacked out sector, toward the SSE, is due
to terrain blockage.
The photograph on the right shows scan and
processor flexibility, which allows tailoring of
output to unique requirements. In this example,
a raster scan at a range of 3.2 kin, down a
canyon, shows the nocturnal jet. Note the shear
that occurs at the plateau level above the
canyon.
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Session III. Topics
Low-Cost Airborne Lidar for Wind Shear
Loren D. Nelson, OPHIR
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• LIDAR NUMERICAL MODELING RESULTS
• OPHIR LIDAR DESIGN STUDY
• FIELD TESTING AND 1989 TDWR
• CONCLUSION
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FOIL 2
PRIMARY PHASE II TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES
@ ENGINEERING DESIGN OF LIDAR SYSTEM
-- 95%
• CONSTRUCTION OF LIDAR SYSTEM
-- 50%
• LABORATORY TESTING FOR S/N,
HETERODYNE, AND DOPPLER
PERFORMANCE
-- 0%
INITIAL FIELD TESTING
-- 0%
• LARGE SCALE FIELD RESEARCH PROGRAM
-- 10%
• DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORTING
-- 0%
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OPHIR LIDAR DESIGN
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I
CW HETERODYNE SYSTEM
COMPONENT CHARACTERISTICS MANUFACTURER
LASER 5.6 W - 10.6 ttm Line Lite
TELESCOPE DAHL-KIRCHIN f-18 CUSTOM
OPTICS ZINC SELENIDE II-VI Corp
AO MODULATOR 27 MHZ IF Newport EO
DETECTOR HgCdTe BW=50 MHz New England
Res.
SIGNAL
PROCESSOR
HP Spectrum Analyzer HP
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FIELD TESTING AND 1989 TDWR
FOIL 15
+
• DATES: MAY 15 - AUGUST 15, 1989
• LOCATION: DENVER STAPELTON AIRPORT
• PARTICIPANTS: NCAR, NOAA, UNIVERSITIES
-- FAA, NSF, DOC sponsorship
LLWAS, Doppler radars and surface networks from
NCAR and NOAA
• STATUS: FIRST DRAFT OF OPHIR FIELD
TEST PLAN COMPLETE
-- Coordination through Jim Moore of NCAR/RAP
I
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FUTURE PLANS
POlL I '
4'
CONDUCT GROUND FIELD TESTS
• Stapleton Airport
• Summer, 1989
SEEK FOLLOW-ON FUNDING
• Airborne Field Tests
• Ground Long-Term Evaluation
• Interface and Optimization
m
I
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Questions and Answers for All Sessions
(answer already in progress) the comparison between Mesonet and radar observations
and how those events break down in terms of strengths, I think they're referring to this
comparison where in the 1988 cases there were two events that which were seen by
a Mesonet which were missed by the radar and likewise, there were two events which
were seen by the radar and missed by the Mezenet. Going back and checked on the
strengths of those, both of these events which were missed by the radar were below
15 meters per second velocity differential and both of these events, also that were seen
by the radar but missed by the Mesonet were also very weak around 12 meters per
second.
Q: For the box with the matrix, where you've got both the 66 observations by the
Mesonet and by the radar, do you have any differentiation as for strength in those?
A." Yes, and those are basically the .. now you're asking what's the distribution of all
the microbursts that you saw between strong and weak? Is that right? And then,
most of the microbursts were seen by both the radar and the Mesonet.
OK, so it's 97 and 77.
A: No, no, these are how well they were detected, this is just saying that for the
stronger events, we detected 97% of them, for the weaker events, we detected 77%.
If you want to get an notion of the distribution, basically there were 259 out of this
sample, there were almost twice as many observations with strong events (.. goes over
15 Imps]) compared to those that were below. These two numbers here give you that
answer. This is showing ..
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Q: Yea, I see that but how does the 66 come off of that table?
A: We're looking at two different sample sets. The 66 events are the total number
of microbursts. Each microburst event, each meteorological event counted once and
that's over the 2 months of July and August. Right, and those are only those that fell
within the region covered by both the Mesonet and the radar.
Well, then this chart is not pertinent to my question. Can we go back to the other
chart?
You're asking of these 66, how many were weak and strong?
Of these 66, how many of them were above 15 meters per second in their maximum
and how many of them of were below?
I don't have that number precisely, I would off hand guess roughly half were below
and half were above.
Because earlier today, we heard .. not necessarily today but in the meeting, we heard
some discussion about these weak ones, they can crash some airplanes too and from
the beginning it was obvious that TDWR was going to do very well on the real strong
ones but I would like to know what that split is on those 66 in terms of those that
went above 15 meters per second and those that never went above.
Yes, I can answer that question for you off line, ! think that relates a little bit to Fred
Proctor's other question which is as you change the definition threshold for velocity
differential, how do the statistics change between the numbers of dry versus wet
microbursts and I think that's a little bit related to your question Norm. In general,
looking over the last several years, our observations and looking at the distributions
of strengths of microbursts, you see something like an exponential decaying distribution
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so that the number of microbursts versus strength. We generally keep track of
microbursts down to the threshold of roughly 10 meters per second and you've seen
thousandsof microbursts, I shouldn't say thousands,at least a thousand microbursts
between 10 and 12 meters per secondvelocity differential. So far, I think we've only
seen two microbursts with a velocity differential rate of 40 meters per second so
there's a very rapid taper and as you raise that threshold Delta V for windshear,
you're willing to accept as a microburst, you're number of events drops off rapidly.
There have been a number of studies looking at a correlation between surface
reflectivity and strength, basicallyyou seeno correlation at all. Whatever ratio a dry
to wet microburst, which is very regionally dependent, the delta V threshold doesn't
appear to make any difference. We haven't seen any correlation between outflow
strength and surface reflectivity level. Does that answeryour question Fred?
Fred Proctor Q: Have you actually looked at the numbers, I mean gone through and
done the statistics on that? A" Both in the JAWS report and in our studies from last
year and this year in Denver, we looked at scattergrams trying to look for a
relationship between surface reflectivity and outflow intensity. Basically, there's no
correlation whatsoever. Q: How about in other parts of the country? Have you
looked at this yet? A: We have observations from Memphis and Huntsville in
Alabama and I think that in the two ye_lrsof observations we made there, I can't
remember if we sawone or two microburstswhich were classifiedas dry. It's certainly
not enough to draw any conclusionsabout correlation of strengthwidth, essentiallywe
saw none in the southeast, and as we go to other parts of the country, Kansas City
and wherever we go from there, that's certainly a studythat we're interested in but the
extent that we've seenlow reflectivity microbursts, I'm not aware of anyonewho's been
able to see the slightest hint of correlation between their strength and their intensity
in reflectivity research.
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There were some questions that didn't get typed up, which I perhaps can try and go
through very quickly. The first question is what kind of false alarm break do you feel
to be expectedfor the 6 minute precursor alarm. A: That's an area that hasn't been
looked at very carefully. What we do know is that when we see precursors we see
them several minutes in advance of surface outflow. In terms of taking a setting and
saying, how often do you see these same precursors and you've not seen microbursts.
I'd say that's something we haven't looked at very carefully and certainly the false
alarm rate there is the big thing to be concerned about and I'm afraid I'd be loafed
to judge any kind of statistic to that, that's something that we're just beginning to look
at.
Second is, "what's your opinion about how good the truth is that you compare your
microburst detected by TDWR?"
A" The answer to that is pretty good. In most of these cases, as I mentioned, a
tremendous amount of effort has gone into the development of this ground truth data
base and for several years, we've been going though the processes of developing single
doppler ground truth, that is where experienced people, I mean these are people who
have been doing this for several years, look at the same radar data that's used by the
algorithms, trying to identify where microbursts exist. That's an intermittent process
that get's looked at several times, it gets, refined and corrected. The process that
people from NCAR are now involved with is looking at dual doppler information,
trying to identify ground truth, it's a good deal more objective and should result in
even higher quality ground truth. Assuring quality of that data is something, and as
I mentioned put a very high priority on it and we have a lot of confidence in it. Third
question is are there precursor programs available to be shared with this community?
Yes, in a sense that these algorithms are documented and in fact, part of the Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar System Specification. In fact, that's another part of the
program which has taken up a lot of the effort: formally documenting these
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algorithms so that they can be implemented by the system contractors. The actual
software implementations that we use to compute these in the test bed, are in a sense,
available in that it would certainly be possible to make arrangements to use those if
there was someone who was really interested in that. The last question is, do you
have additional source field of reflectivity to improve microburst simulation models?
I'm not sure exactlywhat that means. One of the difficulties we have is .. excuseme,
I think the question he was asking to model the dust and other things that are in the
simulation other than moisture, didn't he mention dust and something else in there ..
yes, if additional source field of reflectivity dust and bugs .. I think that he meant to
add to the reflectivity information the backscatter levels from bugs and dust. If the
question is, "if we try to figure out what contribution those sources would make
towards reflectivity," the answer is no.
I would like to add that those questionswere submitted by Cliff Schroederof NASA
Langley and he gave them to me, Bracalenteof NASA, so that it gets into the record.
I didn't speak until I had the microphone. Spady is training me. Wayne Sand had
a number of questions but he had fixed outbound. He will get in touch with the
l_eople personally and then give us copies,of the answers. Our last set of questions is
from Mssr. Bonnefay and then we will close.
I have two questions, one/?/one/.9/. Can I start by the/?/. Mr. Bonnefay, that's me.
Is a copy of your presentation available? Yes, it is. I gave a copy to Herb
Schlickermaier yesterday and in this paper, there is not only a presentation of the
guidance but of the wind shear warning and also on wind shear guidance. The second
question, the /.9/one is that one from Mr. Gaines, that's interesting. The direction
change is not really apparent, what is the source of the wind shear warning. I thank
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you for that question because I consider that it was not at all apparent I switched from
the wind shear warning itself due to the time schedule but I can show you a
viewgraph .. lights out .. this is the principal wind shear warning computation. It's not
a warning taking into account separating factual or how is that a factor. It's a warning
taking into account of the aircraft present energy from the angle of attack which is the
best evaluation of your present energy taking into account sure of the setup and flaps
position and considering the angle of attack would increase the angle of attack by
several equivalent angle of attack estimated coming from the longitudinal wind derived
source longitudinal shear from the memorized head wind increase before the shear
appears it's a little bit predictive. Decreased by the min wind speed, equivalent angle
of attack this is to decrease nuisance warning due to turbulence and wind creates also
the general angle of attack by any equivalent angle of attack due to the vertical wind
combining also those values we can have an efficient wind shear warning which is not
related only to the wind itself. The main result in my finding is that we reach a very
low level of nuisance warning compared to a simple measurement of the separating
factor or the F factor, or the "SF" factor. You have here a comparison between a
conventional wind shear warning nuisance performance warning and zero burst wind
shear warning. We used for search and evaluation the AC 2057A wind model and we
simulated more on the 500 simulation and on the left you have the level of warning
appeared using a conventional system using F factor evaluation and on the right you
have the nuisance warning level reached by the airbus wind shear warning. You can
see on one side 10 to the minus 3 on the other side 10 to the minus 6. It was the
goal which intended to reach because 10 to the minus 6 could be approximate activity,
the wind shear and contour probability. But I can speak longer and longer on the
warning, but see it fit here to stop.
Mr. Bonnefay, have you demonstrated that kind of nuisance performance? Have you
demonstrated it for flight tests? I didn't mean you have to do 10 to 6 cycles .. A: I
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don't have enough experience in flight for/?/but I can confirm this result. Q: Does
your early data suggest that you will meet that 10 to the minus 6? A: I hope it will
meet but if I don't meet 10 to the minus 6 with such a device I wonder what would
be the level of nuisance warning reached by the left system using just an F factor. It
could be greater for airbus but it will be greater for the other. Something that is
interesting considering just the AC 2057 A model because I reached using this model
the nuisance warning of 10 to the minus 3. If I remember well, Roland, last year you
demonstrate using a very different model or a very different way to the same level and
if I remember also, in Boeing's studies we can consider that the possibility of reaching
a level of 1.2 G is about 10 to the minus 3 also. So, if you are confident with the left
part of this sheet I supposed that we have to also be confident with the right part of
the sheet. Perhaps.
One other questions I would like to ask is have you made any comparison to your
system with an F factor, for instance? Can you give us a comparison to the nuisance
warning we can expect. A: I supposed the answer is in the attached sheet, but it's
difficult to have a good wind and accurate wind modelization for a precise level of
nuisance warning. So I consider the AC 2057 A wind model, why did I consider that
model. It's just because we use it generally for landing or to landing the most
efficient. It's not certain the very accurate sate model. It's not perhaps a very realistic
model but it is a model and I can compare one system and also the system being a
commonly agreed wind shear wind turbulence model. It's what we did and if FAA or
NASA develop a new wind turbulence model it could be interesting to do exactly the
same job using more realistic wind turbulence simulation in order to see if there is
different level of wind shear warning and if we maintain the 10 to the minus 3
difference between an F factor system and an airbus wind shear warning system. We
will do one in the future if the wind shear turbulence model is available.
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JQ: There's really no G threshold equivalent to your system? A: It could be, but
look for/?/equivalent, you must have a detection at .24 G, that's to say that when yo u
detect it's really a little bit too late.
Q: Do you have equivalent data to this that shows the probability of a missed alert
with the two different systems? A: About missed alert, I have no probability, what
we demonstrate is that if we don't have an alert the plane can land safely or can go
on the takeoff safely. All we detect and we have to oblige a normal procedure. Or
we don't detect and we have to demonstrate that we can land safely or go on the
takeoff safely but I don't know the possibility to reaching at deliver of those non-
detection possibility of an opposite rating. Perhaps you have one.
Q: Maybe I should ask the question a different way? Do you have a feel for what
the difference in relative timings of the alert are between the two system of how
quickly your system will alert the time delay as compared to the conventional system?
A: Yes, it's extremely difficult to report to answer that question due to fact that we
consider the angle of attack, angle of attack represents the present situation of the
plane and if you are in a very low energy situation, if you are flying at 1.3 V-Stall
landing, you will have a very fast warning. It's about the same and sometimes quicker
than the F system. If you are flying 1.5 V-Stall in that case the F system could warn
earlier than airbus system, but if you are flying 1.4 or 1.5 V-Stall, you have a strong
energy margin and you can wait for just a little while in order to prevent false warning
or nuisance warning, so consider if your level of energy is slow because you fly 1.3
V-Stall or perhaps lower because there is an error, you will be warned very soon and
if you have a very high level of energy, you will be warned later than the F system.
This is Howard Long with Delta. Does your system in any way provide you with a
warning on a positive energy shear? A: No. Q: Have you made analysis of of that
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as compared with the number of wind shears? A: We consider that it was not
absolutely necessary because our plane, our protection devices outflow forward
function, and your outflow forward function, alreadymade protection, if we don't have
the outflow forward function, certainly that we had implemented the alert on the
increase inertia differ. But, due to the fact that it's perhaps not very good to increase
the number of warnings in the cockpit, we prefer to develop only the red warning,
taking into account there is a after/?! protection with the outflow forward function.
Q: If that information is available, don't you think it could be provided to the pilot?
Q: If you've got the equipment on the airplane that's capable with providing the pilot
with a positive shear data, that is, that you are in a significant increasingperformance
shear, shouldn't that information be available to pilots?
A: Yes, it is, considering the preliminary flight display where you have your speed
scan,your speed also and you can compare your speed answer,nominal 1.3with stall
speedor 1.2 so,you know you are increasingstrongly your speedand adjusting looking
between your speed and your back speed exit. You have it all the time.
Q: Now did I understand from one slide that you already have this system certified?
A: Yes, this systemwas certified last year for the A300 aircraft and certified as the
A310 aircraft since April 1988and it will be certified before the A310 next month and
delivery at the beginning of 1989 and we intend to certify very similar systemmainly
for the warning for the 320 next year for delivery at the end of the year, something
like that.
Just quickly, I might point out that the Boeing systemis also being changedto account
for higher energy levels above the 1.3 V-Stall. We agree, it's a good idea.
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APPENDIX A
SECOND COMBINED MANUFACTURERS'
AND TECHNOLOGY AIRBORNE WIND
SHEAR REVIEW MEETING
-Agenda-
TUESDAY, 18 October 1988
7:45 Registration
8:45 Introduction of Guest Speaker
Herbert Schlickenmaier, FAA
9:00 Welcome
Dav/d Johnson, FAA
9:25 Logistics
Amos Spady, NASA LaRC
SESSION I AIRBORNE - TERMS OF REFERENCE
9:30 Meeting Goals, Session Introduction
Roland Bowles, NASA LaRC
9:45 Tools of the Trade
Wall)" Gillman, American Airlines
10:05 SAE-S7 Wind Shear ARP
Bob Ireland, United Airlines
10:25 Break
10:45 Wind Shear Regulatory Activities
Steve Morrision, FAA
11:05 Flight Experience with Wind Shear Detection
Terry Zweifiel, Honeywell/Sperry
II:25
11:45
Interface Standards for Integrated Predictive/Reactive WindShear Systems
Mark McGlinchey, Honeywell/Sperry
Lunch
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SESSION II
12:45
12:50
1:10
1:30
1:50
2:10
2:30
3:20
AIRBORNE - IIAZARD DEFINITION
Session Introduction
Amos Spady, NASA LaRC
Heavy Rain Effects on Airplane Performance
Earl Dunham, NASA LaRC
Small Aircraft Performance in Wind Shear
Dick Bray, NASA ARC
11 July, Weather and Resulting TDWR Alarms
Wayne Sand, NCAR
Numerical Simulation of 11 July, Denver Microburst Storm
Fred Procter, MESO
Break
11 July, Denver Wind Shear Encounters
Bob Ireland, United Airlines
Questions and Answers for 18 October sessions
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WEDNESDAY, 19 October 1988
8:00 Registration
9:15
10:05
10:30
10:45
11:05
11:25
11:45
12:45
SESSION I AIRBORNE. SENSORS
8:30 Session Introduction
Roland Bowles, NASA I.aRC
8:40 Wind Shear Radar Status Review and introduction
E. M. Bracalente, NASA LaRC
8:50 Analysis of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Data for Wind Shear Radar
S. Harrah, NASA LaRC, V. Deinore, Kentron, and
D. Gineris, ERIM
Preliminary Airborne Wind Shear Detection Radar Assessment Study
C.. L. Britt, RTI, and E. M. Bracalente, NASA LaRC
9:50 Clutter Filter Design Considerations for Airborne Wind Shear
E. Baxa and A. Mackenzie, NASA I.aRC
Airborne Radar Scatterometer Design & Flight Tests
Bill Jones and C.arrol Lyric, NASA I.aRC
Break
Status of IR System Tests
Fat Adamson, TPS
Status of Delco/Hughes IR Efforts
Brian Gallagher, Delco/Hughes
IR Thermal Imaging of Atmospheric Turbulence
Bill Pfeil, Kollsman
Lunch
Investigation of Airborne Lidar for Avoidance of Wind Shear Hazards
Russell Targ, Lockheed
1:05 2.1 Micron Lidar Technology Program Status
Mark Storm, NASA I.aRC
SESSION II AIRBORNE - FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
1:25 Session Introduction
Roland Bowles, NASA LaRC
1:40 Alert Filtering and Time Constants
Kioumars Najmabadi, Boeing
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2:00
2:20
2:40
3:00
3:20
3:40
4:00
4:15
4:30
Hight Guidance Research
Dave I4_inton, NASA LaRC
Break
Analysis of Guidance Law Performance Using PC Models
Rene Barrios, Honeywell/Sperry
FLight Deck Research
Dave Carbaugh, Boeing
An Expert System for Wind Shear Avoidance
Robert Stengel, Princeton
Effect of Wind Shear During Takeoff Roll on Stopping Distance
Terry Zweifiel, Honeywell/Sperry
Wind Shear Wind Model Simulator Analysis Status
Bernard Ades, DGAC/SFACT/TV
wiad Shear Predictive Detector Technology Study Status
C., Gandolfi, DGACdSTNA/3
Question and Answer Session for 19 October
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THURSDAY, 20 October 1988
SESSION I GROUND SYSTEMS
8:30
8:40
9:00
9:20
9:40
10:00
10:20
10:40
11:00
11:20
11:40
12:50
1:00
2:00
2:50
3:00
Session Introduction
Herbert Schlickenmaier, FAA
TDWR Program Status
Art Hansen, FAA
LLWAS Program Status
Craig Goff, FAA
1988 TDWR Operational Demonstration in Denver
John McCarthy,NCAR
F-FactorConcept Appliedto SurfaceMeasurements
Wayne Sand,NCAR
Break
Summer' 88 TDWR M/croburstAnalysis
Mark Merritt, Lincoln Labs
Automatic Detection of Low Altitude Wind Shear Related Gust Fronts
Diana Klinge-Wilson, Lincoln Labs
Sam Saint's Five Minutes
Sam Saint, Safe Flight
Lessons Learned
William Laynor, NTSB
Lunch
Introduction of Session
Amos Spady, NASA LaRC
Ten Minute Presentations by those requesting time not available on the
program schedule
Questions and Answers for all sessions
Closing Remarks
Herbert Schlickenmaier, FAA
Roland Bowles, NASA LaRC
Conference Closed
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